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Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I 
provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate 
information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because 
the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and 
monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first 
show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment 
arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and 
sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used 
jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 
141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a 
significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel 





Accomplishing this dissertation for my Ph.D. degree would have been more arduous if I 
had not received others’ help. I am deeply grateful to my doctoral advisor, Edward Xuejun Li, 
for guiding me with extraordinary patience during the past six years. From evaluating research 
ideas to reviewing dissertation drafts, he gave me the benefit of his intelligence and experience 
whenever my progress stalled. When in 2019 I was disheartened by an unsuccessful job search, 
I recovered my courage and confidence through his help and advice. What I learned from 
Professor Li will have the lasting impact on my future career. 
I also benefited from the advice of my dissertation committee members: Masako Darrough, 
Xi Dong, and Monica Neamtiu. From them, I gained valuable knowledge about developing 
ideas and carrying out research. Professors Darrough and Neamtiu also provided generous 
support in connection with my job search.  
I am grateful to the comments from Philip Berger, Jeremy Bertomeu, Donal Byard, Ming-
Cherng Deng, Heedong Kim, Seil Kim, Kalin Kolev, Karl Lang, Heemin Lee, K. Ramesh, Xin 
Wang, Joseph Weintrop, Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, Yue Zhang, and my Ph.D. colleagues. 
They were generous with their time and I thank them for the opportunity to discuss my 
dissertation with them. Insightful suggestions were also provided by workshop participants at 
Central University of Finance and Economics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, 
Fudan University, Xiamen University, and Xi’an Jiaotong University. Besides, I acknowledge 
the financial resources provided by City University of New York through Carrel Dissertation 
Fellowship and Doctoral Student Research Grant. Zhiyuan (Tommy) Tu generously provided 
his PERL programs. 
Without the selfless support of my parents, Xuehai Yuan and Li Wu, I would not have been 
able to pursue a doctorate in the U.S. I am particularly indebted to my wife, Hemeng Sun, for 
 vi 
her patience during our long separation. Her humor and optimism always alleviated the 
pressure that I experienced in the course of my research. Special thanks to Feng Liu, my 
master’s advisor, who offered me this great opportunity to study at Baruch College. Alma 
Flesch, my warmhearted English teacher, significantly improved my writing and speaking 
skills with sincere care and help. 
I am fortunate to have acquired many genuine friends in New York City. Xintian (Tammy) 
Lin gave me great support in my research and life, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Jianyu Pan and Junhua Yang listened to my complaints and consoled me when I was facing 
difficulties. Other friends, such as Jing (Jodie) Dai, Ge (Melody) Dong, Daeun (Philip) Lee, 
Heyun (Emma) Li, Yan Li, Ying Liang, Saghar Samimy, Amanda Sanseverino, Yu Shan, Ye 
Yang, Saeyoung Yoon, Jiakai Zhang, Binghao (Jimmy) Zhao, Changyun Zhou, and Xiaoyun 
(Ross) Zhu also assisted me in overcoming many setbacks. I hope and believe that these 




Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………….…………...………… 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………….………………….………… 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 1 
CHAPTER TWO: DIRECT ASSET SALES…………………………………………………. 7 
2.1 Institutional Background………………………………………......…………………. 7 
2.2 Prior Literature on Direct Asset Sales………………………………………………... 9 
CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT…………………………………… 11 
3.1 Valuation-Related Information Frictions……………………………………………. 11 
3.2 Payment-Related Information Frictions…………………………………………...... 12 
3.3 Relationship among Contracting Mechanisms……………………………………… 14 
CHAPTER FOUR: SAMPLE AND DATA…………………………………………………. 16 
4.1 Agreement Collection and Classification…………………………………………… 16 
4.2 Data Collection and Variable Construction…………………………………………. 18 
4.2.1 Dates, Transaction Roles, and Non-Filers’ Characteristics…………………… 18 
4.2.2 Target Assets…………………………………………………………………. 18 
4.2.3 Purchase Price and Payment Arrangements………………………………...... 18 
4.2.4 Representations and Warranties……………………………………………… 19 
4.2.5 Covenants…………………………………………………………………...... 20 
4.2.6 Other Contractual or Transaction Characteristics…………………………...... 20 
4.2.7 Complementary Mechanisms………………………………………………… 21 
CHAPTER FIVE: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES…………………………………….……… 22 
5.1 Structure of Direct Asset Sales Agreements………………………………………… 22 
5.2 Distribution of Direct Asset Sales Agreements………………………………...…… 23 
 viii 
5.3 Description of Contracting Mechanisms……………………………………………. 24 
5.3.1 Accounting Covenants……………………………………………….………. 24 
5.3.2 Financial Information Reps…………………………………………………... 24 
5.3.3 Financing Covenants…………………………………………………………. 25 
5.3.4 Financial Condition Reps………………………………………………….…. 25 
5.3.5 Payment Arrangements………………………………………………………. 26 
5.3.6 Other Provisions……………………………………………………………… 26 
CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL RESULTS…………………………………………………... 28 
6.1 Research Design…………………………………………………………………...... 28 
6.2 Individual Contracting Mechanisms………………………………………………... 29 
6.3 Complementary Contracting Mechanisms……………………………………….…. 29 
6.4 Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity………………………………………... 30 
6.5 Relationship between Payment and Non-Payment Mechanisms……………………. 31 
6.6 Expected Contract Duration……………………………………………………….... 32 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………...... 34 
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………………. 60 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions………………………………………………………. 71 
A.1 Variables of Sellers’ Contracting Mechanisms………………………………… 71 
A.2 Variables of Buyers’ Contracting Mechanisms………………………………... 71 
A.3 Other Variables………………………………………………………………… 72 
Appendix B: Examples of Contracting Mechanisms…………………………………… 73 
B.1 Accounting Covenants (Sellers)……………………………………………...... 73 
B.2 Financial Information Reps (Sellers)…………………………………………... 73 
B.3 Financing Covenants (Buyers)………………………………………………… 74 
B.4 Financial Condition Reps (Buyers)……………………………………………. 74 
 ix 
B.5 Payment Arrangements…………………………………………………...…… 75 
B.6 Miscellaneous Mechanisms…….……………………………………………… 76 




List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection…………………………………………………………………… 39 
Table 2: Agreement Distribution………………………………………………………......… 40 
Table 3: Summary of Contracting Mechanisms……………………………………………... 43 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………………...... 45 
Table 5: Individual Contracting Mechanisms………………………………………………... 47 
Table 6: Complementary Contracting Mechanisms…………………………………………. 50 
Table 7: Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity………………………………………. 53 
Table 8: Relationship between Payment and Non-Payment Mechanisms…………………… 56 
Table 9: Expected Contract Duration………………………………………………………... 58 
Table A1: Individual Contracting Mechanisms – Robustness Test after Controlling for Fixed 
Effects……………………………………………………………………………………...... 65 
Table A2: Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity – Robustness Test after Controlling for 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Two Contracting Stages…………………………………………………………… 38 
Figure 2: Three Categories of Contracting Mechanisms…………………………………...... 38 
Figure A1: Agreement Distribution by Year………………………………………………… 61 
Figure A2: Agreement Distribution by Industry………………………………......………… 62 
Figure A3: Agreement Distribution by SEC Form…………………………………………... 63
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Direct asset sales are a type of transaction that allows one company to acquire specific 
assets from another business. 1  Such transactions usually involve substantial value. For 
example, in 2019, Apple Inc. purchased the smartphone modem business of Intel Corporation, 
a transaction valued at $1 billion and involving 2,200 Intel employees.2 In the U.S., direct 
asset sales comprise nearly one-half of corporate assets traded, with the other half through 
mergers and acquisitions (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). 
Globally, direct asset sales have transferred $1.2 trillion assets between 2019 and 2020 and 
continue to grow in a surging trend (Maral, 2021). Despite the economic importance, the 
distinct information frictions within these transactions and how contracts are structured to 
mitigate such frictions have received limited attention from prior empirical research. This paper 
fills this void by analyzing these contractual relationships, using a unique sample of direct asset 
sales agreements in the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings. 
An in-depth investigation on these contracts is needed because direct asset sales are distinct 
from other types of transactions examined in the prior contracting literature. Specifically, 
unlike typical M&A transactions (“M&As”), direct asset sales transfer only partial assets rather 
than the entire business: asset-specific financial information is generally scarce and lacks 
auditors’ verification (Berger and Hann, 2007; D’Souza, Ramesh, and Shen, 2010; Chen, Miao, 
and Shevlin, 2015); shareholders and antitrust regulators also have less authority to scrutinize 
or intervene such transactions (Shukairy, 2006; Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka, 2009). In 
addition, given that buyers and sellers continue to operate as separate entities, seller managers’ 
																																																						
1 In this paper, “direct asset sales,” “asset sales,” and “asset purchases” refer to the same type of transaction. 
2  Having been announced on July 25, 2019, the transaction was completed on December 2, 2019. See 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/07/apple-to-acquire-the-majority-of-intels-smartphone-modem-
business/ and https://newsroom.intel.com/news-releases/intel-completes-sale-smartphone-modem-business-
apple/#gs.yoto4n for more information. 
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career concerns are less of an issue in these transactions (Cain, Denis, and Denis, 2011; 
Schoenfeld, 2020). Importantly, since direct asset sales tend to be consummated in a short 
period of time and are not expected to repeat, such transactions have limited hold-up problems 
with relationship-specific investment, which is critical to a supply relationship (Costello, 2013). 
These distinct features, taken together, create a unique setting to test predictions about how 
contract design helps mitigate asset valuation-related information frictions. Specifically, in 
negotiating transaction price, the scarcity of verified financial information on target assets 
makes them difficult to value, leading to the adverse selection issue (Akerlof, 1970). Once the 
price is settled, the shortage of asset-specific information also makes target assets difficult to 
monitor, triggering the moral hazard problem in which sellers could expropriate target assets 
(Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). I predict that transaction parties, to mitigate these frictions, could 
employ certain contracting mechanisms to improve financial reporting and monitoring of target 
assets. However, if such mechanisms are less effective due to the difficulty in preparing and 
verifying asset-specific financial information, special payment arrangements could serve to 
alleviate the conflict of interests (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey, 2010; Chen, 2019). 
Although prior theoretical work analyzes the use of individual contracting mechanisms to 
mitigate information frictions, it provides limited guidance on whether various contracting 
mechanisms should be used jointly or as substitutes for one another. Armstrong, Guay, and 
Weber (2010) also note that different contracting mechanisms could be either complements or 
substitutes. Recent empirical studies on other types of contracts tend to find a substitution effect. 
For example, Costello (2013) shows that in supply relationships, which tend to be long term, 
the two contracting mechanisms, contract duration and financial covenants, are substitutable. 
Nevertheless, given the unique scarcity of asset-specific information and short contract 
duration in direct assets sales, I predict that transaction parties could respond to the severe 
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information frictions by relying on complementary mechanisms. For example, pre-contract 
asset-specific reporting and post-contract accounting covenants could jointly mitigate 
information asymmetry and facilitate the valuation and monitoring of target assets. Although 
multiple mechanisms could enhance performance, they could be costly to write and enforce, 
especially as the transaction lasts longer (Tirole, 1999; Battigalli and Maggi, 2002). Therefore, 
it is an empirical question whether direct asset sales agreements employ different contracting 
mechanisms jointly or separately. 
To test these predictions, I compile a large sample of direct asset sales agreements in the 
SEC filings using Python and then hand-collect detailed information from each agreement 
about three categories of contractual provisions: representations and warranties (“reps”), 
covenants, and special payment arrangements. Reps can verify financial information regarding 
target assets, as well as transaction parties per se, before formal agreements become effective, 
whereas covenants can discipline transaction parties’ accounting treatment afterward. 
According to my predictions, when buyers are more concerned about the valuation and 
condition of target assets, they would impose on sellers more reps and covenant provisions that 
stipulate the quantity and quality of sellers’ financial information. Special payment 
arrangements, like equity or cash payments, could also solve information frictions ex post. 
Therefore, when facing higher uncertainty about target assets value, buyers would also avoid 
immediate cash payments and choose a delayed payment. From the sellers’ perspective, if they 
are uncertain about buyers’ financial liquidity, they would prefer more financing provisions 
that specify how buyers secure their funding. Timely cash payments would also be required by 
sellers. 
To construct a proxy for the severity of information frictions, I follow prior research to 
identify whether buyers or sellers are private firms in that privately held firms are required to 
provide less public disclosures and tend to have more opaque information environment (Cassar, 
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2011; Gustafson, Ivanov, and Meisenzahl, 2020). In my sample, either sellers or buyers can be 
private firms. In the first set of analyses, I examine which contracting mechanisms are used to 
mitigate valuation-related information frictions. I find that when sellers are private firms, 
contracts are more likely to include (1) reps for sellers to verify the integrity of their interim 
financial information, (2) covenants that require sellers to continue financial reporting and 
maintain consistent accounting policies, and (3) equity payment arrangements that align the 
interests of transaction parties. These findings are consistent with the use of sellers’ reporting 
reps, accounting covenants, and equity payments to mitigate seller-side information frictions. 
In the second set of analyses, I examine which contracting mechanisms assist in alleviating 
payment-related information frictions. My findings show that direct asset sales agreements 
involving private buyers are more likely to contain reps that verify buyers’ pre-contract 
liquidity condition regarding their cash holdings and credit arrangements, and covenants that 
regulate buyers’ post-contract financing activities. Furthermore, the agreements are more likely 
to require that private buyers make a timely cash payment and exclude delayed payments. 
These findings suggest that buyers’ liquidity reps, financing covenants, and cash payments are 
employed to tackle buyer-side information frictions. 
In the third set of analyses, I focus on the six types of provisions and investigate their 
relationship to explore whether they are used as complementary or substituting mechanisms to 
mitigate severe information frictions. The results suggest that the contracts with private sellers 
tend to jointly use more seller reporting reps, accounting covenants, and equity payment 
arrangements. This relation is robust to different research design specifications. The other three 
mechanisms related to buyers’ price payment, including financing covenants, liquidity reps, 
and cash payments, show a similar pattern of being jointly used. 
To evaluate the prevalence of complementarity, I further study the use of bundled 
mechanisms. For example, an agreement could simultaneously contain accounting covenants, 
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reporting reps, and equity payments. I find that when seller-side information asymmetry 
becomes more severe, to mitigate valuation-related frictions, the agreements are more likely to 
use the bundle of the three mechanisms or their mechanism pairs. I also document a positive 
association between buyer-side information asymmetry and the simultaneous use of buyers’ 
mechanisms such as financing covenants, liquidity reps, and cash payments. These results 
suggest that the use of complementary mechanisms becomes more prevalent when direct asset 
sales are likely to be hampered by severe information frictions. Other characteristics of direct 
asset sales, including high purchase price, a complex structure of target assets, and transaction 
materiality, are also associated with the inclusion of bundled mechanisms. 
The mechanism complementarity may be explained by transaction parties’ incentives to 
use as many contractual provisions as possible, because doing so in a short-term contracting 
process is less costly. To examine the validity of this explanation, I exploit the adoption of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) 141(R) as an exogenous shock to the 
contract design. Since SFAS 141(R) requires that firms disclose more information about the 
fair value of earnout, the increased cost discourages the use of equity or contingent payments 
(Cadman, Carrizosa, and Faurel, 2014; Bates, Neyland, and Wang, 2018). Instrumenting for 
the payment arrangement choice based on SFAS 141(R)’s adoption, a bivariate Probit model 
regression shows that the use of non-payment mechanisms such as reps and covenants drops 
when the agreements contain fewer special payment arrangements. The findings are suggestive 
of transaction parties’ reliance on the mechanism complementarity. 
While direct asset sales are usually consummated in a short period, I also look into 
variations in the expected length of contract duration, which is an important contractual 
characteristic (Costello, 2013). Given the complexity of direct asset sales, transaction parties 
need to be prepared for more uncertainty as the expected contract duration becomes longer. 
Noting that the explicit statement of expected closing date is an endogenous choice, I use the 
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Heckman selection model to address the potential self-selection issue before investigating the 
determinants of duration length. With both accounting covenants and financing covenants 
showing a positive relation, my findings suggest that transaction parties rely on covenants to 
cope with the uncertain prospect brought by the longer contract duration. 
My study contributes to the contracting literature in three aspects. Presenting the novel 
evidence of direct asset sales agreements, this paper sheds light on the role of complementary 
contracting mechanisms in mitigating information asymmetry, suggesting that reps, covenants, 
and special payment arrangements could be used jointly. By documenting the valuation and 
disciplinary roles of financial reporting in direct asset sales, my analyses also expand the 
knowledge about accounting in the contracting process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). 
Further, my results are suggestive of the joint effects produced by the solutions to adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Darrough and Stoughton, 1986; Banker, Darrough, Li, and 
Threinen, 2019). Nonetheless, my investigation concentrates on a subset of contracting 
mechanisms included in direct asset sales agreements. It would be intriguing to explore the 
characteristics of other contractual provisions. Whether a broad spectrum of mechanisms 
exhibit complementarity or substitution effects is an interesting research question. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
characteristics of direct asset sales and relevant studies. I develop the hypotheses on the use of 
contracting mechanisms in Section 3. Section 4 describes the procedures of collecting 
agreements and constructing variables. Section 5 summarizes descriptive analyses, and Section 




CHAPTER TWO: DIRECT ASSET SALES 
 
2.1 Institutional Background 
In direct asset sales, buyers acquire a specific portion of sellers’ total assets, which could 
be a business unit, such as a subsidiary, a division, and a segment, or specific assets, such as 
fixed assets, personal properties, and intellectual properties (Alexander, Benson, and 
Kampmeyer, 1984; Jain, 1985). Different from M&As, direct asset sales do not change the 
ownership structure of sellers, allowing these firms to relieve financial distress or enhance 
operation efficiency by disposing assets. Taking advantage of the flexibility in direct asset sales, 
buyers could target specific assets without committing to acquire sellers’ entire business. 
Although only partial assets of sellers are traded, the value of these transactions can be 
substantial.3 
The transaction procedures of direct asset sales share a lot of similarities to those of M&As. 
Starting from a preliminary negotiation, buyers and sellers exchange confidential information 
to settle down a letter of intent for further cooperation and discussion (Brown, 2007). As the 
negotiation unfolds, both sides conduct due diligence investigation with the assistance from 
counsels and advisors (McConnell and Cole, 2012). After deciding to engage in a deal, sellers 
and buyers enter into direct asset sales agreements on the agreement effective date, and they 
close the transaction on the sales closing date.4 During the gap period between the two dates, 
sellers and buyers need to prepare for the transaction closing (Lopez, 2015). 
Despite these similar procedures, the contracting process of direct asset sales can be more 
complicated than M&As’ (Egan, Balotti, Patrick, and Doliner, 2005). Since only partial assets 
																																																						
3 For instance, starting in early 2018, Chinese HNA Group Co. made a series of direct asset sales totally worth 
more than $25 billion (Dormido, 2019); in 2019 General Electric Co. decided to sell its biopharma business for 
$21.4 billion (Smith and Westin, 2019); in 2017 The Cooper Companies Inc. paid $1.1 billion cash to purchase 
the global right and business associated with a medical device owned by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.; on 
July 21, 2020, eBay Inc. reached a deal to sell its Classifieds business unit to Adevinta ASA for $9.2 billion. 
4 The two dates are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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and certain liabilities would be transferred, it is necessary that sellers and buyers clearly 
identify and specify the components of target assets and assumed liabilities. Moreover, the 
value of different categories of assets should be separated because transaction parties need to 
allocate the purchase price.5 However, sellers are rarely required to disclose the disaggregate 
financial information of partial assets. An extensive audit is also not applied to sellers’ partial 
assets during ordinary operation.6 As a result, it is difficult for buyers to verify the value of 
target assets. The process of transferring target assets is also time-consuming. Sellers and 
buyers need to obtain consents from third parties before re-assigning contractual rights.7 
Buyers may also apply for governmental authorization to retitle sellers’ licenses and permits. 
In addition, a pre-merger notification filing must be sent for antitrust review if the purchase 
price or the size of transaction parties exceeds pre-specified thresholds.8  To prepare the 
notification filing, transaction parties have to determine which assets are reportable under the 
HSR Act.9 These complicated procedures increase the difficulty of monitoring target assets’ 
condition after the agreement effective date. 
Direct asset sales usually have short contract duration, which ranges from a few days to a 
few months.10 For example, in 2014, in a transaction closed within merely 19 days, Toro 
																																																						
5 In the United States, purchase price allocation is subject to SFAS 141(R) and SFAS 142. Buyers need to 
negotiate with sellers to determine the value of each component of target assets and assumed liabilities. Both 
sellers’ sales tax and buyers’ tax deduction are influenced by the allocation result (Kerchner, 2019). 
6 According to the auditing standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), auditors 
should consider segment information as part of the consolidated financial statements, instead of performing the 
audits as extensive as if a separate opinion would be required for the segment information. See the paragraph 31 
of the PCAOB’s AU 9326 (https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/archived-standards/pre-reorganized-auditing-
standards-interpretations/details/AU9326_24-41) and the appendix B2 of the PCAOB’s AS 2810 ( 
https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/auditing-standards/details/AS2810). Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 131 also provides much discretion to managers in terms of preparing segment financial information. 
7 Some contracts are not assignable, requiring a novation when they are transferred from sellers to buyers (Egan 
et al., 2005). 
8  The value of the thresholds is adjusted periodically in compliance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act (“HSR Act”). 
9 An example is provided by Informal Interpretation No. 0805021: https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-
notification-program/informal-interpretations/0805021 . 
10 My sample contracts, randomly drawn from a comprehensive collection of asset sales agreements found in the 
SEC filings, are mainly short term. In my sample, among the agreements specifying the expected closing date, 
the median of contract duration is only 6 days and the mean is 43 days. Only four contracts are anticipated to be 
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Company paid $227 million to buy BOSS Snow Management Business from Northern Star 
Industries, Inc. 11  Despite the short contract duration, sellers typically demand a higher 
purchase price to compensate for the ordinary income tax rate incurred by direct asset sales 
(De Laria and Driskell III, 2020). Moreover, the majority of direct asset sales prefer cash 
proceeds, catering to sellers’ financing needs (Lang et al., 1995; Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek, 
2005). In contrast, acquirer and target firms are more inclined to initiate share exchange to 
complete M&As. 
 Shareholders and regulators have limited impact on direct asset sales, whereas they play 
a more influential role in M&As. Direct asset sales provide more discretion to the board of 
directors so long as their decisions can be justified by the business judgment rule (Hege et al., 
2009). Delaware law does not require direct asset sales to be approved by sellers’ shareholders 
and does not authorize appraisal or dissenters’ rights to the shareholders (Shukairy, 2006). The 
contracting process of direct asset sales is therefore less likely to be subject to shareholders’ 
intervention. Even when antitrust regulators review direct asset sales, transaction parties 
confront less scrutiny because the flexibility of direct asset sales facilitates the development of 
a permissible transaction structure. Thus, the course of direct asset sales is mainly determined 
by the private negotiation between sellers and buyers. 
2.2 Prior Literature on Direct Asset Sales 
Literature on direct asset sales mainly consists of three lines of work. A set of pioneer work 
documents the wealth effect of public announcements regarding direct asset sales (Alexander 
et al., 1984; Jain, 1985; Klein, 1986; Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro, 1995). Further, a subsequent 
series of studies investigate two motivations of engaging in such transactions. Direct asset sales 
																																																						
closed one year after the agreement effective date.	
11 Other anecdotal examples include: Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc. entered into an agreement on June 29, 2017 
to buy 2,186 stores from Rite Aid Corporation and completed the transaction on March 27, 2018; Warner Chilcott 
PLC agreed to sell certain product licensing rights to LEO Pharma A/S on September 23, 2009 and their 
transaction was consummated on the same day. 
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constitute a financing channel for sellers to undertake their investment projects (Bates, 2005; 
Lang et al., 1995). This channel reduces sellers’ cost of capital if external financing has a higher 
cost because of agency problems, such as asset substitution, debt overhang, and managerial 
discretion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990). Sellers also resort to direct 
asset sales when dealing with bankruptcy and financial constraints (Pulvino, 1998, 1999; 
Campello et al., 2010). Debt capacity and asset liquidity are therefore critical determinants 
(Kruse, 2002; Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). In the midst of an economic 
downturn, sellers might dispose assets at a much cheaper price through fire sales (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992, 2011). 
The second motivation is to improve operating performance through direct asset sales 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Warusawitharana, 2008). Disposing unprofitable or non-
essential assets enables sellers to focus on their core business units (Ofek, 1993; John and Ofek, 
1995; Weisbach, 1995; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003). In addition, Bartov (1993) documents 
that managers use the proceeds of direct asset sales to smooth earnings numbers and circumvent 
the limitations imposed by bond covenants. Buyers can also benefit from the synergy generated 




CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Valuation-Related Information Frictions 
Buyers are concerned about the value and condition of target assets. To avoid 
overestimating the asset value, buyers need the financial information of target assets, which 
may be critical in the valuating process (McNichols and Stubben, 2015; Rabier, 2017). 
However, granular financial information pertaining to specific assets is scarce because 
managers usually choose to withhold disaggregated information (Berger and Hann, 2007; 
D’Souza et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015). In addition, auditors do not audit the financial 
information of specific assets as extensively as they would if these assets were taken as a 
separate entity. Due to the asymmetric information, buyers would protect themselves by 
discounting the purchase price, leading to the valuation-related adverse selection. 
Before target assets are transferred, their value is subject to change because sellers’ 
operating activities could alter the asset value. Moreover, sellers are less incentivized to protect 
target assets’ condition in the aftermath of the agreement effective date because the purchase 
price has already been determined. Given the fact that sellers’ efforts of protecting target assets 
are unobservable, buyers would pay the same purchase price on the sales closing date even if 
the asset value has declined. The overpayment could result in a dispute and time-consuming 
adjustment to the purchase price (Johnson, 2011). Thus, the valuation-related moral hazard 
could decrease the transaction efficiency. 
Judicious contracting mechanisms could help sellers and buyers alleviate these valuation-
related information frictions. Since timely financial information assists buyers in appraising 
target assets, the reps that guarantee the integrity of sellers’ interim financial information could 
mitigate the valuation-related adverse selection. To monitor target assets’ value, buyers could 
use accounting covenants that require sellers to prepare periodic financial statements and 
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maintain consistent accounting policies. Through aligning the interests of sellers and buyers, 
equity payments, as a type of special payment arrangement, could incentivize sellers to disclose 
more information and protect target assets. Nonetheless, the accounting-based reps and 
covenants might not be used because it is costly to verify and prepare additional financial 
information (Chen, 2019). Sellers also likely prefer cash payments to satisfy their financing 
needs (Lang et al., 1995; Campello et al., 2010). 
Since private firms are much more opaque than public firms, direct asset sales that involve 
private sellers face higher risks arising from sellers’ asymmetric information. If each of the 
three mechanisms is effective, buyers have stronger incentives to use them individually when 
trading with private sellers. Therefore, I propose my first hypothesis below in the alternative 
form. 
H1: The involvement of private sellers in direct asset sales is positively associated with the 
individual use of accounting covenants, reporting reps, or equity payments in direct asset sales 
agreements. 
3.2 Payment-Related Information Frictions 
The price payment is important for sellers, especially when they regard direct asset sales 
as an alternative financing channel (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). To receive the entire purchase price, prior to the 
agreement effective date, sellers need information to evaluate buyers’ payment capacity. The 
lack of the relevant information would discourage sellers from participating in direct asset sales 
because of the uncertainty about the price payment. The payment-related adverse selection 
could impede the transaction progress. 
Upon entry into agreements, buyers would start preparing their payment that depends on 
either internal funds or external financing proceeds (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani, 2003). Since direct asset sales agreements are usually expected to be closed in a 
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short period, it is necessary that buyers secure adequate funds in a timely manner. However, 
buyers’ managers have incentives to overinvest in order to expand the company size to an 
excessive scale (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986, 1993). If the overinvestment strains 
buyers’ liquidity, sellers’ receipt of the purchase price has to be delayed, and the transactions 
might be eventually terminated due to buyers’ payment failure. Both situations, as the possible 
consequences of the payment-related moral hazard problem, would impose significant 
opportunity costs on sellers. 
The uncertainty concerning the price payment could be reduced by certain contracting 
mechanisms. Sellers could impose liquidity reps on buyers to ensure that buyers possess 
sufficient funds or have obtained credit arrangements as of the agreement effective date. In 
addition, financing covenants could regulate buyers’ price payment by stipulating that enough 
funds be secured prior to the sales closing date. Furthermore, sellers could require the payment 
to be made in full cash, rejecting stocks, promissory notes, and contingency payments, in case 
sellers could not obtain cash from these special payments (Bates et al., 2018; Jansen, 2020). 
Notwithstanding, the three contracting mechanisms significantly raise the threshold for buyers 
to engage in direct asset sales. Transaction parties therefore need to trade off the related benefits 
and costs. 
Since private firms provide less public information, it is more difficult for sellers to 
evaluate the payment capacity of private buyers and to observe their efforts of preparing funds. 
Sellers should have stronger motivations to implement each of the three mechanisms when 
dealing with private buyers. Based on the preceding analysis, I propose my second hypothesis 
below in the alternative form. 
H2: The involvement of private buyers in direct asset sales is positively associated with 
the individual use of financing covenants, liquidity reps, or cash payments in direct asset sales 
agreements. 
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3.3 Relationship among Contracting Mechanisms 
Recent economic research provides insights on how multiple mechanisms could jointly 
mitigate information frictions in the contracting process. Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) show 
that in a persuasion model, if agents do not always tell their true profiles, to alleviate adverse 
selection, the principal can design a contract composed of multiple contractual clauses so that 
the high threshold of disguising true profiles precludes agents from misrepresentation. 
Jakobsen (2020) examines a model in which a contract is designed to reveal truthful reporting 
by maximizing the number of contractual clauses, and the agent is prevented from transiting to 
its desired state. The two papers suggest that the complementarity among contracting 
mechanisms could mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Given the severe information frictions caused by direct asset sales’ unique features, buyers 
and sellers could exploit mechanism complementarity to enhance the transaction efficiency. 
Reporting reps, which guarantee the integrity of sellers’ pre-contract financial information, and 
accounting covenants, which administer sellers’ post-contract financial information, could 
jointly help buyers appraise and monitor target assets. A big discrepancy between the two 
periods of financial numbers could indicate that sellers has misrepresented the pre-contract 
financial information by exaggerating the asset value (Roychowdhury, 2006). The discrepancy 
could also suggest that target assets’ value has significantly changed. 
Equity payments could have an incremental contribution to mitigating the seller-side 
information frictions. Despite the valuation role of reporting reps, equity payments enable 
sellers to signal target assets’ quality (Hege et al., 2009). The interests of sellers and buyers are 
also aligned by equity payments in a period longer than the coverage of accounting covenants. 
Thus, equity payments could be used to complement reporting reps and accounting covenants. 
The complementarity between liquidity reps, financing covenants, and cash payments 
could assist sellers in receiving the entire purchase price. Liquidity reps, which guarantee 
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buyers’ entry into credit arrangements, and financing covenants, which require buyers to 
prepare adequate funds, could jointly administer the price payment. Cash payments, which 
specify that the entire purchase price be paid in cash on the sales closing date, could 
complement liquidity reps and financing covenants by urging buyers to complete financing. 
Although sellers and buyers could benefit from the complementarity among multiple 
mechanisms, they would likely assume higher contracting costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Tirole, 1999; Battigalli and Maggi, 2002). For example, it is costly to design a contract 
including many clauses; the simultaneous compliance with reps, covenants, and special 
payment arrangements might consume many resources; the renegotiation becomes costlier if 
many clauses have to be modified at the same time (Williamson, 1985; Rey and Salanie, 1990). 
Hence, whether sellers and buyers use the mechanism complementarity needs further 
investigation. 
When trading with private firms, the transaction parties could have a stronger tendency to 
employ complementary mechanisms because private sellers and private buyers could lead to 
severer information frictions. Therefore, I propose my third hypothesis below in the alternative 
form. 
H3: The involvement of private sellers (buyers) in direct asset sales is positively associated 
with the simultaneous use of accounting (financing) covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, and 




CHAPTER FOUR: SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
4.1 Agreement Collection and Classification 
I collect direct asset sales agreements (“ASAs”) from the exhibits of the SEC filings in 
four steps. I first download the SEC current reports, periodic reports, and registration 
statements from the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system 
(“EDGAR”) and keep the filer firms (“filers”) that have all required database identifications.12 
Second, I extract Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 10 by parsing the SEC filings. In the third step, an 
agreement is selected if its first 30 lines or its first 150 words comprise capitalized words 
“ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT.”13  Fourth, I eliminate the agreements whose titles 
include “STOCK,” “SECURITY,” or “SHARE,” because such agreements involve the trade of 
sellers’ shares, and by following the method of Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), I also delete the 
misidentified loan agreements that mention “ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT” at the 
beginning. After the four steps, 7,830 ASAs are collected from the SEC filings, which were 
posted to the EDGAR between 1994 and 2017. 
I filter the collected ASAs to drop unqualified agreements in the following six steps. I first 
delete 1,374 agreements filed by financial institutions (SIC: 6000-6999) or by the firms from 
regulated industries (SIC: 4400-5000). In the second step, by searching the titles and recitals 
of ASAs for “amend,” “addendum,” and “restate,” I take out 942 amended agreements, 
addenda, and restated agreements, which either provide only modified provisions or restate the 
entire modified agreement. Third, I remove 169 ASAs that do not have the agreement effective 
date. Fourth, through sorting filers’ CIKs and the agreement effective date, I eliminate 533 
duplicates that are ancillary agreements or repeatedly filed by the same firm. 
																																																						
12 I follow the SEC filing taxonomy shown in the Internet Appendix IB of Li, Ramesh, Wu, and Shen (2018). 
13 Direct asset sales agreements are titled “Asset Purchase Agreements” in practice. 
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In the fifth step, I differentiate the agreements that relate to direct asset sales from those 
that cover de facto mergers. The underlying transactions are classified as direct asset sales if 
they satisfy one of the following five criteria.14 Target assets are sold by filers; 8-K filings 
describe the agreements as “Certain Asset Purchase Agreement;” the recitals of ASAs mention 
“certain asset” or “specific asset,” and neither the recitals nor 8-K filings mention “all asset;” 
8-K filings mention “certain asset” or “specific asset,” and neither the recitals of ASAs nor 8-
K filings mention “all asset;” the manual investigation into the recitals of ASAs and related 
filings recognizes the underlying transactions as direct asset sales. The five criteria enable me 
to remove 1,595 agreements of de facto mergers. 
In the sixth step, I further delete 521 agreements because they are part of mergers, joint 
ventures, stock purchases, or partial interest acquisitions. To find these agreements, I search 
the recitals of ASAs for the keywords indicative of such transactions. I also rely on the 
Securities Data Company (“SDC”) database that classifies such transactions into “Acquisition 
of Major Interest,” “Acquisition of Partial Interest,” and “Acquisition of Remaining Interest,” 
“Acquisition,” and “Merger.” I match ASAs to the records of the SDC database by filers’ 
CUSIP, the agreement effective date, and the sales closing date.15 The two methods drop 521 
ASAs related to mergers and other unqualified transactions. My full sample therefore includes 
2,696 qualified ASAs that relate to direct asset sales. 
I randomly select 900 agreements to hand-collect direct asset sales’ characteristics and 
contractual provisions. I discover and delete 55 agreements, which lack required data or engage 
special entities such as individuals, proprietorships, and not-for-profit organizations.16 Thirty-
six agreements are further removed from my sample because 24 ASAs miss certain control 
																																																						
14 The concrete examples that illustrate the five criteria are provided by Appendix C. 
15 The SDC database names the sales closing date “deal effective date.” ASAs are taken out if their agreement 
effective date is within the 61 calendar days prior to the “deal effective date” of an unqualified event and the 
CUSIP of the filers is matched to the CUSIP of either target firms or acquirer firms in the event. 
16 For example, some ASAs do not specify the purchase price; some are scanned documents unable to process.  
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variables and 12 ASAs are filed by both sellers and buyers. Eight hundred and nine agreements, 
which have all required information and control variables, constitute my random sample. 
4.2 Data Collection and Variable Construction 
I use Python programs and hand-collection to extract contractual provisions and 
transaction characteristics from ASAs and the related SEC filings. A series of indicator 
variables are created based on the collected data. I further construct several control variables 
to capture filers’ characteristics.17 
4.2.1 Dates, Transaction Roles, and Non-Filers’ Characteristics18 
From the contract preamble of ASAs and the related SEC filings, I collect the agreement 
effective date, filers’ transaction roles, and non-filers’ names and transaction roles. To figure 
out whether non-filers are private firms, I search the Company File of Compustat by matching 
the names and postal codes of non-filers. S&P Capital IQ is also used to supplement my search 
and collect non-filers’ postal codes. The indicator variables Private Seller and Private Buyer 
describe non-filers’ private ownership. The expected closing date is also collected from the 
contract article “Closing.” 
4.2.2 Target Assets19 
I create two variables to summarize the characteristics of target assets. Based on the recitals 
of ASAs and the content of 8-Ks, I classify target assets into division or unit assets and create 
the indicator variable Division Assets. The information about the complexity and components 
of target assets is extracted from the contract sections “Purchased (Excluded) Assets” and 
“Assumed (Excluded) Liabilities.” The variable Asset Complexity counts the number of words 
that describe target assets. 
4.2.3 Purchase Price and Payment Arrangements 
																																																						
17 All variables are defined by Appendix A Variable Definitions. 
18 The structure of ASAs is described by Section 5.1. 
19 ASAs usually refer to target assets as “purchased assets.” 
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The majority of ASAs specify the purchase price’s number in the contract section 
“Purchase Price,” whereas some agreements describe only the number of shares or the scheme 
of contingent payments. When no concrete purchase price is found, I estimate the expected 
purchase price with the information available in the contracts.20 The variable Price Ratio is 
then calculated by dividing the purchase price by filers’ total assets. 
After extracting the contract sections “Purchase Price” and “Contingent Payments,” I 
search for the keywords that specify the details of payment arrangements. Two variables are 
created to reflect the special payment arrangements: the indicator variable Equity Payments 
measures whether buyers are permitted to pay shares, and the indicator variable Cash Payments 
captures if sellers exclude other payment arrangements but demand that the entire purchase 
price be paid in cash on the sales closing date. 
4.2.4 Representations and Warranties 
To characterize the reps of ASAs, I extract the contract sections such as “Financial 
Statement (Information),” “Absence of Certain Change,” “Undisclosed Liabilities,” and 
“Books and Records” from the contract article “Representations and Warranties of Seller.” I 
search them for some keywords to identify specific contractual provisions. For example, the 
keywords “month” and “unaudited” assist in creating the indicator variable Reporting Reps, 
which measures whether the contracts verify the interim financial information of the pre-
contract period. Sellers’ other accounting and financing practices are also identified from those 
contract sections. 
In terms of buyers’ contractual provisions, I focus on certain sections of the contract article 
“Representations and Warranties of Buyer.” I search financing-related contract sections to find 
the provisions that describe buyers’ solvency, financing commitments, or capitalization 
																																																						
20 If buyers pay shares but do not provide the share value, the expected purchase price = the number of shares*10; 
if an earnout scheme specifies the conditional payment but does not mention the length of the payment period, 
the expected purchase price = the payment made per year*10. 
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condition. The indicator variable Liquidity Reps captures whether the contracts verify buyers’ 
pre-contract financial condition with respect to solvency and financing commitments. Some 
ASAs also stipulate the accounting-related contract sections for buyers. 
4.2.5 Covenants 
To delineate the characteristics of the covenants, I extract the contract section “Conduct of 
Business” from the articles “Covenants of Seller” and “Conditions to Obligations of Seller.” I 
search for the keywords that indicate the contractual provisions regulating sellers’ accounting 
policies or requiring the delivery of post-contract financial information. The two accounting-
related provisions are measured by the indicator variable Accounting Covenants. Sellers’ 
financial covenants and capital expenditure covenants are collected as well.  
With respect to buyers’ covenants, I collect the provisions relevant to financing activities 
from the contract articles “Covenants of Buyer” and “Conditions to Obligations of Buyer.” The 
provisions that are intended to secure the price payment are identified by the indicator variable 
Financing Covenants. I also extract other covenants that require buyers to deliver post-contract 
financial information or monitor buyers by restricting the range of their financial ratios or 
accounting numbers. 
4.2.6 Other Contractual or Transaction Characteristics 
I create four variables to describe other important characteristics of direct asset sales and 
ASAs. Since filers can use special marks to redact the proprietary information, I construct the 
indicator variable Redaction as the proxy for redacted disclosures (Verrecchia and Weber, 
2006). With the postal codes collected from ASAs, I create the indicator variable International 
Deal to reflect the cross-country transactions. By using the coordinates of the postal codes, I 
measure the geographical proximity between sellers and buyers with the variable Distance, 
which records the logarithm value of the transaction parties’ mile distance. The variable 
Current Report indicates whether ASAs are filed in the exhibits of the SEC current reports. 
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4.2.7 Complementary Mechanisms 
To measure the extent to which direct asset sales rely on complementary mechanisms, I 
construct a series of discrete variables for both sellers and buyers. Based on the variables such 
as Accounting Covenants (Financing Covenants), Reporting Reps (Liquidity Reps), and Equity 
Payments (Cash Payments), the value of the variable #Acc_Rep_Equity (#Fin_Liq_Cash) 
indicates how many contracting mechanisms are imposed on sellers (buyers). I also create other 
discrete variables such as #Acc_Rep, #Acc_Equity, and #Int_Equity (#Fin_Liq, #Fin_Cash, 
and #Liq_Cash) to measure how the contracts employ specific mechanism pairs of sellers 
(buyers). 
Some indicator variables are constructed to capture the use of bundled mechanisms. The 
variable D.Acc_Rep_Equity (D.Fin_Liq_Cash) equals 1 when ASAs simultaneously specify 
the reps, covenants, and special payment arrangements for sellers (buyers). In addition, to 
measure the inclusion of mechanism pairs, I create the variables D.Acc_Rep, D.Acc_Equity, 
and D.Int_Equity (D.Fin_Liq, D.Fin_Cash, and D.Liq_Cash) regarding sellers’ mechanisms 




CHAPTER FIVE: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Structure of Direct Asset Sales Agreements 
Direct asset sales agreements (“ASAs”) of my sample are filed as material contracts in the 
SEC filings (Li, 2013). Like other types of contracts, ASAs are mainly composed of contractual 
provisions such as articles, sections, and clauses. Each article consists of several sections, 
which are further divided into clauses (Weagree, 2019). Including a variety of provisions, 
ASAs are intended to specify the background, schedules, and other details of direct asset sales. 
In addition to provisions, ASAs can also contain some exhibits, which provide the definitions 
of contract terms, describe ancillary agreements, or enumerate disclosure schedules. 
At the beginning of ASAs, two contract articles introduce the background of direct asset 
sales. The article “Preamble” describes the agreement effective date, the identity of sellers and 
buyers, and their parents or subsidiaries involved in the transaction. In addition, the article 
“Recital” introduces sellers’ operation, target assets, and the transaction’s basics. Two other 
contract articles detail the schedules of direct asset sales. The article “Purchase and Sale” lists 
the components of target assets through four contract sections: “Purchased Assets,” “Excluded 
Assets,” “Assumed Liabilities,” and “Excluded Liabilities.” Additionally, the article “Closing” 
specifies the expected closing date and the purchase price.21 It also sets forth the rule of 
adjusting the purchase price as well as the deliveries that transaction parties should make on 
the closing date (Johnson, 2011). 
The majority of remaining contract articles verify pre-contract disclosures and discipline 
post-contract actions. The article “Representations and Warranties” guarantees that the pre-
contract disclosures of sellers and buyers are accurate;22  the article “Covenants” include 
																																																						
21 Some ASAs use a separate article to specify the provisions related to the purchase price. 
22 The contract sections of the article “Representations and Warranties” are hereby named “reps.” 
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affirmative or negative provisions, which regulate the post-contract actions of sellers and 
buyers; 23  the article “Conditions to Obligations,” similar to “Covenants,” sets forth the 
prerequisites that sellers and buyers must satisfy to close the transaction.24  For the three 
contract articles, ASAs separately present sellers’ provisions from buyers’. If the transaction 
parties breach any provisions, penalties would be imposed in accordance with the contract 
articles “Termination,” “Indemnification,” and “Miscellaneous,” which specify the conditions 
on terminating agreements, indemnifying counterparties, and fulfilling other specified 
obligations (Brown, 2007). 
5.2 Distribution of Direct Asset Sales Agreements 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample ASAs over agreement effective years, 
industries, and SEC filing types. As Panel A shows, sample ASAs are mainly distributed 
between 1993 and 2017. Covering 28.18% of the random sample ASAs, the period from 1996 
to 1999 manifests an active engagement in direct asset sales; companies signed 14.09% of the 
random sample ASAs between 2000 and 2002; the years from 2003 to 2006 present 28.56% of 
the random sample ASAs. The number of ASAs significantly declined in 2008. 
Based on Fama-French 49 Industry Classification, Panel B reports the ASAs’ industry 
distribution.25 Although direct asset sales can occur in a variety of industries, some industries 
provide a higher fraction of sample agreements. For instance, 8.53% of the random sample 
ASAs are from the pharmaceutical product industry; the business service industry supplies 
7.42%; the computer software and electronic equipment industries contribute to the sample by 
10.63% and 9.15%, respectively. 
																																																						
23 The sections of the article “Covenants” are hereby named “covenants.” Affirmative covenants summarize the 
activities that transaction parties must complete, whereas negative covenants set forth the prohibited conducts. 
The article “Covenants” can also be decomposed into pre-closing covenants and post-closing covenants. In ASAs, 
pre-closing covenants are usually named “Conduct of Business Pending the Sale.” 
24 Since this article is also intended to regulate transaction parties’ behaviors, I regard its sections as covenants. 
25 Even though I follow Fama-French 49 Industry Classification to present the industry distribution, subsequent 
regression tests are based on Fama-French 12 Industry Classification to maintain a consistent sample between the 
Probit model and the OLS model. 
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The distribution over three types of the SEC filings is presented by Panel C. I find that 
61.06% of the random sample ASAs are filed with the SEC current reports, which disclose the 
entry into such agreements through Item 1.01 and announce the completion of the transactions 
in Item 2.01; the SEC periodic reports provide 32.39% of the random sample ASAs, and the 
SEC registration statements supply 6.55%. The distribution of 2,696 full sample ASAs is 
similar to that of 809 random sample ASAs, suggesting that the random sample is 
representative of direct asset sales’ characteristics. 
5.3 Description of Contracting Mechanisms 
To study the contracting mechanisms related to accounting, financing, and target assets, I 
extract different contractual provisions from ASAs. Table 3 summarizes sellers’ contracting 
mechanisms, buyers’ contracting mechanisms, and payment arrangements collected from 809 
random sample ASAs. The characteristics of these mechanisms are described below.26 
5.3.1 Accounting Covenants 
Accounting covenants discipline two types of accounting-related activities. Negative 
accounting covenants prevent transaction parties from arbitrarily changing accounting policies 
and estimates, and affirmative accounting covenants require the delivery of financial 
information, which can be regular, such as monthly, or be non-periodic. The delivered financial 
information, which is usually presented in the format of financial statements, can be used to 
monitor target assets’ condition or prepare regulatory filings. Table 3 shows that 34.12% 
(1.98%) of the sample ASAs impose accounting covenants on sellers (buyers). 
5.3.2 Financial Information Reps 
Financial information reps verify the quality and quantity of the financial information 
provided prior to the agreement effective date. 27  Since sellers’ pre-contract financial 
																																																						
26 The examples of different mechanisms are shown by Appendix B. 
27 Similar to the report of unqualified auditor opinion, financial information reps usually state that “the financial 
information satisfies fair presentation in all material respects and conforms to effective accounting principles.” 
 25 
information can assist buyers in appraising target assets, financial information reps are related 
to either target assets or transaction parties per se. Based on a fiscal period or an interim period, 
the report of the financial information is usually presented in the format of the balance sheet, 
the income statement, and the statement of cash flows. 
Table 3 shows that 71.69% of the sample ASAs require sellers to make financial 
information reps. Specifically, the reps related to interim financial information are found in 
32.26% of the sample ASAs, and the reps about carve-out financial information, which is based 
on target assets, exist in 60.44% of the sample ASAs. Panel A shows that sellers verify different 
financial statements such as the balance sheet (46.68%), the income statement (21.88%), and 
the statement of cash flows (26.21%). In contrast, the financial information reps of buyers are 
present in 12.48% of the sample ASAs. 
5.3.3 Financing Covenants 
Financing covenants require buyers to secure adequate funds before the sales closing date. 
A common prerequisite of financing covenants is that buyers have entered into a binding 
commitment with creditors or other investors. The covenants could require buyers to complete 
financing by executing the credit arrangement that has been approved by sellers. Table 3 Panel 
B shows that 12.48% of the sample ASAs contain such covenants to discipline buyers’ 
financing activities. 
5.3.4 Financial Condition Reps 
Financial condition reps verify the cash holdings, credit arrangements, or capitalization 
condition of transaction parties. They typically ensure that transaction parties have sufficient 
funds, either of their own or from credit facilities, to complete direct asset sales, or they 
describe the authorization and issuance of transaction parties’ capital stock. Table 3 Panel B 
presents that 38.07% of the sample ASAs require buyers to make such reps. Sellers also comply 
with financial condition reps in 17.92% of the sample ASAs. 
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5.3.5 Payment Arrangements 
Payment arrangements are critical mechanisms to direct asset sales. For example, Hege et 
al. (2009) analyze the tradeoff between cash and equity payments. Cash payments may rely on 
the use of third-party escrow.28 In addition, promissory notes can be paid as a type of seller 
financing (Jansen, 2020). Buyers can also engage in contingent payments, such as earnouts and 
royalty. Earnouts allow buyers to make payments after the sales closing date when pre-
specified goals are achieved (Cain et al., 2011).29  
According to Table 3 Panel C, cash payments are required by 94.31% of the sample ASAs, 
and 30.66% of the sample ASAs implement third-party escrow. I find that 28.68% of the 
sample ASAs rely on non-cash payments such as equity (20.15%) and promissory notes 
(10.75%).30 Contingent payments are specified in 17.43% of the sample ASAs. 
5.3.6 Other Provisions 
ASAs can impose other provisions, which are relevant to accounting, financing, and target 
assets, on sellers and buyers. Table 3 Panel A shows that 14.83% of the sample ASAs contain 
capital expenditure covenants that limit sellers’ post-contract investment; financial covenants, 
which restrict the range of sellers’ financial ratios or accounting numbers, are found in 6.06% 
of the sample ASAs; undisclosed liability reps are included in 40.05% of the sample ASAs to 
ensure that sellers do not underreport liabilities; in 19.04% of the sample ASAs, sellers use 
books and records reps to guarantee that their internal accounts are accurate and are prepared 
with good business practice; audit, review, and internal control reps, which exist in 2.72% of 
the sample ASAs, state that sellers have maintained reliable accounting and internal control 
systems so that the previous transactions are legitimate and accurately recorded; adverse 
																																																						
28 Third-party escrow requires buyers to prepay an amount of money to an escrow agent before the transaction is 
closed. The money will be held by the escrow agent, which complies with an escrow agreement, until all pre-
specified conditions are satisfied. 
29 For example, the sales of the purchased division pass the pre-specified threshold of ASAs. 
30 The percent numbers inside parentheses denote the fraction of the sample ASAs. 
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change reps, which usually specify that no material changes are made to sellers’ accounting 
policies, and no excessive capital expenditure is incurred by sellers during the pre-contract 
period, exist in 61.68% of the sample ASAs. Although buyers also comply with similar 
provisions, as Table 3 Panel B shows, the fraction of their accounting-related mechanisms are 
much smaller. Buyers’ contracting mechanisms are more likely to focus on financing. Besides, 
the sample ASAs also include asset-specific provisions, like intellectual property reps 





CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 Research Design 
To investigate the association between information frictions and the use of contracting 
mechanisms, I apply the Probit model and the OLS model shown below. 
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Model (1) is a Probit model, which predicts the probability of using specific contracting 
mechanisms, and Model (2) is an OLS model, which controls for year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects. Both models are intended to examine the use of individual contracting 
mechanisms and the prevalence of mechanism complementarity. I rely on Model (2) to check 
the use of complementary mechanisms. Following the prior research, I use the indicator 
variables Private Seller and Private Buyer to measure the severity of information frictions 
because private firms tend to have a more opaque information environment and make fewer 
public disclosures (Minnis, 2011; Minnis and Sutherland, 2017). 
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6.2 Individual Contracting Mechanisms 
To examine the first and the second hypotheses, I analyze the use of individual contracting 
mechanisms and report regression results in Table 5. Based on both Model (1) and (2), the 
results of Panel A suggest that the use of accounting covenants, reporting reps, and equity 
payments is associated with the severity of seller-side information frictions. In terms of the 
probability of using any of the three mechanisms, ASAs are 11.67% more likely to impose 
accounting covenants on private sellers; the likelihood of using reporting reps increases by 
7.69% if buyers trade with private sellers; ASAs involving private sellers are 17.50% more 
likely to employ equity payments. The findings support the prediction of the first hypothesis 
and suggest that the three mechanisms are serve an important role in mitigating information 
frictions. 
Table 5 Panel B suggests that the severity of buyer-side information frictions are 
significantly related to the inclusion of financing covenants, liquidity reps, and cash payments. 
If buyers are private firms, the likelihood of using financing covenants and liquidity reps 
increases by 7.02% and 5.83%, respectively. Private buyers are also 12.37% more likely to pay 
the entire purchase price in cash on the sales closing date and exclude other types of payment 
arrangements. The results are consistent with the second hypothesis. All the findings about 
individual contracting mechanisms are robust to controlling for year and industry fixed effects. 
6.3 Complementary Contracting Mechanisms 
To test the third hypothesis, I initially focus on the three sellers’ mechanisms, such as 
accounting covenants, reporting reps, and equity payments, and analyze whether they tend to 
be used jointly. Table 6 Panel A presents a positive association between the severity of seller-
side information frictions and the use of multiple sellers’ mechanisms, suggesting that ASAs 
involving private sellers are inclined to use more mechanisms. Taking the three mechanisms 
together, Column (1) shows that trading with private sellers is associated with employing 
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additional 0.4075 mechanisms. Given the fact that sellers comply with 0.8653 mechanisms on 
average, the number of mechanisms increases by 47% when private sellers engage in direct 
asset sales. Panel A Columns (2) to (4) also indicate the number of mechanisms significantly 
increases if different mechanism pairs are imposed on private sellers. 
I further investigate the three buyers’ mechanisms, such as financing covenants, liquidity 
reps, and cash payments. Table 6 Panel B shows that ASAs with private buyers use additional 
0.2419 mechanisms, which are 25% of the average 0.9679 mechanisms imposed on buyers. 
The results suggest that the severity of buyer-side information frictions is positively associated 
with the use of multiple mechanisms. According to Panel B Columns (2) to (4), different 
mechanism pairs are also employed jointly if private buyers participate in the transaction. In 
comparison to sellers’ mechanisms, buyers’ mechanisms manifest less pronounced 
complementarity. The contrast suggests that seller-side information frictions are more 
significantly associated with the use of complementary mechanisms. 
Several characteristics of direct asset sales are also related to the joint use of different 
mechanisms. Table 6 indicates that the high purchase price and a complex asset structure are 
associated with imposing multiple mechanisms on sellers and buyers. In addition, material 
direct asset sales, measured by trading division assets or disclosing through the SEC current 
reports, are linked with the simultaneous use of sellers’ mechanisms. These results suggest that 
complementary mechanisms are more likely to be used to enhance the transaction efficiency 
of complex or material transactions. 
6.4 Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity 
I further conduct a battery of stricter tests to examine the prevalence of the mechanism 
complementarity faced by sellers and buyers. The regression results of Table 7 use a group of 
indicator variables, which measure the use of bundled mechanisms, as dependent variables. 
For example, D.Acc_Rep_Equity equals 1 if ASAs contain accounting covenants, reporting 
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reps, and equity payments simultaneously; D.Fin_Liq equals 1 if financing covenants and 
liquidity reps are imposed on buyers in the same contract. 
Table 7 Panel A shows that bundled mechanisms are more likely to be used for private 
sellers. Specifically, ASAs involving private sellers are 5.80% more likely to implement the 
three sellers’ mechanisms jointly, and are 7% to 12% more likely to use different mechanism 
pairs. These findings still hold after controlling for year and industry fixed effects. In addition, 
if direct asset sales are material transactions, which are disclosed by the SEC current reports, 
ASAs are more likely to impose bundled mechanisms on sellers. 
The findings concerning buyers’ bundled mechanisms are reported by Table 7 Panel B. I 
find a positive association between the use of the bundled mechanisms and the severity of 
buyer-side information frictions. Column (1) shows that private buyers are 2.51% more likely 
to use financing covenants, liquidity reps, and cash payments in the same contract. As Columns 
(2) to (4) indicate, the likelihood of using mechanism pairs increases by 3% to 7% when ASAs 
involve private buyers. When the purchase price is high or target assets have a complex 
structure, bundled mechanisms are also more likely to be employed for buyers. These results 
suggest that buyers’ mechanisms have a stronger connection with the transaction’s economic 
importance. Overall, the use of complementary mechanisms is prevalent in direct asset sales, 
particularly so when transaction parties need to mitigate severe information frictions. 
6.5 Relationship between Payment and Non-Payment Mechanisms 
An alternative explanation to the use of multiple mechanisms is that transaction parties try 
to employ as many mechanisms as possible but do not rely on their complementarity. To rule 
out this explanation, I investigate the relationship between payment and non-payment 
mechanisms by using the setting of SFAS 141(R)’s adoption. The accounting standards’ 
revision is plausibly exogenous to the choice of payment arrangements but is unrelated to the 
use of reps or covenants. 
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SFAS 141(R) became effective on December 15, 2008 and mandates the acquirer firm to 
disclose the earnout’s fair value on a regular basis. The increased disclosure cost incurred by 
the standards revision discourages firms from using equity and contingent payments, which 
usually involve earnout payments.31 Following Bates et al. (2018), I use a bivariate Probit 
model to include Post SFAS 141, an indicator variable equal to one if the agreement became 
effective after January 1, 2009, as an instrumental variable for the payment arrangement choice, 
which is represented by Equity Payments and Cash Payments. To capture the use of both reps 
and covenants, I construct Seller Non-Payment Mechanisms (Buyer Non-Payment 
Mechanisms), two indicator variables equal to one if the contract includes reps or covenants 
for sellers (buyers), as the dependent variable. 
Table 8 reports the association between payment and non-payment mechanisms. Columns 
(1) and (2) focus on the seller-side mechanisms. The results suggest that the adoption of SFAS 
141(R) discourages transaction parties from using equity payments. However, if the agreement 
includes equity payments, transaction parties are 43% more likely to use reporting reps or 
accounting covenants in the same contract. Columns (3) and (4) evaluate the buyer-side 
mechanisms. In contrast to equity payments, cash payments are more likely to be used since 
the adoption of the standards revision. Column (4) presents the positive coefficient of Cash 
Payments, suggesting that the likelihood of using liquidity reps or financing covenants 
increases by 44% when the entire purchase price is required to be paid in cash with no delays. 
These findings are strong evidence supporting that transaction parties rely on the 
complementarity between payment and non-payment mechanisms. 
6.6 Expected Contract Duration 
Direct asset sales agreements could specify an expected closing date, which indicates the 
																																																						
31 SFAS 141(R) could be applied to direct asset sales as long as transferred assets constitute a business according 
to the guidance set forth in the accounting standards. In my sample, 41% contracts explicitly describe target assets 
as a “Business.” SFAS 141(R) has been codified into Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”) 805. 
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expected length of contract duration. Although direct asset sales are generally expected to close 
in a short period, there is still variation in duration. As the transaction lasts longer, unexpected 
uncertainty is more likely to impede the transaction process. Prior research suggests that 
financial covenants could extend the length of contract duration (Costello, 2013). 
To investigate the relationship between covenants and expected contract duration, I rely 
on the Heckman two-stage model to resolve the selection concern because some agreements 
choose not to contain an expected closing date. In the first stage, Price Ratio, Inventory, and 
#Buyer Reps are used to predict the existence of the expected closing date.32 Inventory and 
#Buyer Reps satisfy the exclusion restriction required for identification in the second stage. 
According to Columns (2) and (3) in Table 9, the use of accounting or financing covenants is 
positively associated with the expected length of contract duration. On average, covenants 
could extend the expected contract duration by 0.31 standard deviation. The results suggest 





32 Price Ratio is defined as the ratio of purchase price to the filers’ total assets; Inventory is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the agreement includes the reps regarding the pre-contract condition of target inventory; #Buyer 
Reps is the number of reps that buyers comply with. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the contracting process of direct asset sales. I analyze how contracts 
are designed to address the trading frictions brought by information asymmetry between sellers 
and buyers. The research question is important because direct asset sales, a type of transaction 
of great economic significance, are distinct from other types of transactions that are examined 
by prior research. Different from M&As, direct asset sales trade partial assets, which are more 
difficult to value due to the lack of asset-specific financial information. Such transactions are 
not subject to stringent public oversight and do not need to account for seller managers’ career 
concerns. In addition, the hold-up problem is not the major issue of direct asset sales because 
they are expected to close in a short period and are unlikely to repeat. Such a setting allows me 
to look into association between contract design and valuation-related information frictions. 
Thus, using a unique sample of agreements provided by the SEC filings, I study which 
contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions and their relationship. 
I predict that the likelihood of using particular mechanisms is associated with the nature 
and severity of information frictions. My hypotheses focus on three categories of contractual 
provisions: representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements. 
Reps can verify transaction parties’ pre-contract financial information, and covenants can 
discipline their post-contract accounting treatment. The descriptive analysis of sample 
agreements reveals that sellers’ mechanisms tend to relate to financial reporting and target 
assets, whereas buyers’ mechanisms are inclined to focus on financing activities. Special 
payment arrangements could involve different payment methods, such as cash, equity, 
promissory notes, and contingent payments. Transaction parties’ private firm status is chosen 
as the proxy for severe information frictions. In my sample, either sellers or buyers can be 
private firms. 
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My empirical analyses begin with examining the use of individual contracting mechanisms. 
I first study the three contracting mechanisms that could mitigate valuation-related information 
frictions: (1) accounting covenants that require sellers to continue financial reporting and 
maintain consistent accounting policies; (2) reporting reps that verify the integrity of sellers’ 
interim financial information; (3) equity payments that allow buyers to pay shares as 
consideration. The findings suggest that each of these mechanisms is positively related to the 
severity of seller-side information frictions.  
I further investigate the three contracting mechanisms that could alleviate payment-related 
information frictions: (1) financing covenants that require buyers to secure adequate funds in 
order to close the transaction; (2) liquidity reps that guarantee that buyers’ pre-contract liquidity 
condition is solid; (3) cash payments that ask buyers to pay the entire purchase price in cash 
and not to make delayed payments. My results suggest a positive association between each of 
the three mechanisms and the severity of buyer-side information frictions. 
I then conduct a series of tests to explore the relationship among these mechanisms. My 
analyses show that the contracts with private firms are likely to employ more mechanisms. The 
positive relation between the number of mechanisms and the severity of information frictions 
is suggestive of complementarity between different mechanisms. To evaluate the prevalence of 
the complementary relationship, I examine the use of bundled mechanisms and find that they 
are more likely to be included in contracts when private firms are involved. The findings 
suggest that complementarity becomes more prevalent as information asymmetry grows. 
Several characteristics of direct asset sales, such as the high purchase price, a complex structure 
of target assets, and transaction materiality, are also positively associated with the use of 
complementary mechanisms. 
An alternative explanation to the use of multiple mechanisms is that transaction parties 
attempt to employ as many mechanisms as they can. To test this explanation, I rely on the 
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adoption of SFAS 141(R) to observe relationship between payment and non-payment 
mechanisms. Since the standards revision mandates the acquirer firm to disclose earnout’s fair 
value on a regular basis, it reduces the acquirer’s intention to use equity and contingent 
payments, which usually involve earnouts. Therefore, the adoption of SFAS 141(R) is plausibly 
exogenous to the payment arrangement choice. By using a bivariate Probit model, my analysis 
suggests a positive association between payment and non-payment mechanisms, which cover 
both reps and covenants. The results provide strong evidence supporting that transaction parties 
rely on mechanism complementarity. 
Since contract duration is an important contractual characteristic, I continue to investigate 
the relation between covenants and the expected length of contract duration. I use the Heckman 
two-stage model to solve the selection concern in that some contracts choose not to specify 
expected closing dates. Consistent with the prior literature, my results indicate a positive 
association between the use of covenants and the expected length of contract duration. In direct 
asset sales, covenants are important tools for transaction parties to deal with the uncertainty 
caused by a longer transaction horizon. 
Overall, this study provides early evidence indicating that different contracting mechanisms, 
which are related to accounting, financing, and payment arrangements, are used to mitigate 
severe information frictions in direct asset sales. The likelihood of using these mechanisms 
increases as information asymmetry becomes more severe. Moreover, the evidence in this 
paper suggests that different mechanisms complement one another, and transaction parties rely 
on such complementarity, especially when information frictions are severe. In addition, my 
results indicate that accounting serve both verification and disciplinary roles in the contracting 
process of direct asset sales, and the solutions to moral hazard and adverse selection could 
produce joint effects. Future research can explore other types of provisions that are not covered 
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by this paper. More details about contracting mechanisms and their relationship would help us 





Figure 1. Two Contracting Stages 
 
Figure 2. Three Categories of Contracting Mechanisms 
 
Note: Figure 1 describes the two contracting stages of direct asset sales and two types of 
information frictions that impede the transaction process. Figure 2 shows three categories of 
contracting mechanisms that are found in direct asset sales agreements and the roles of the 
mechanisms. On the agreement effective date, sellers and buyers enter into direct asset sales 
agreements. On the sales closing date, they close the transactions by transferring the asset rights 
and making payments. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Panel A. Agreement Collection     
 #ASAs #ASAs 
Direct asset sales agreements found in the SEC filings (filer firms have 
following identifications: GVKEY, PERMNO, CUSIP, IBTIC, and 
CIK) 
 7,830 
Delete Following Contracts:   
  (1) Contracts filed by financial institutions (SIC: 6000 to 6999) or by 
firms from regulated industries (SIC: 4400 to 5000) (1,374)  
  (2) Amended agreements, addenda, or restated agreements (942)  
  (3) Contracts missing the agreement effective date (169)  
  (4) Ancillary agreements or repeated agreements (533)  
  (5) Contracts of de facto mergers (1,595)  
  (6) Contracts of direct asset sales related to mergers, joint ventures, 
and stock purchases (521)  
Qualified Direct Asset Sales Agreements   2,696 
Panel B. Agreement Sample     
 #ASAs #ASAs 
Qualified Direct Asset Sales Agreements  2,696 
Randomly Selected Agreements  900 
Delete Following Contracts:   
  (1) Contracts engaging special entities or lacking required information (55)  
  (2) Contracts missing control variables (24)  
  (3) Duplicate contracts filed by both sides for the same transactions (12)  
Final Agreement Sample   809 
 
	
Note: Table 1 shows the procedures of sample selection, which result in a full sample of 2,696 
direct asset sales agreements (“ASAs”) and a random sample of 809 ASAs. Special entities 
refer to individuals, proprietorships, and not-for-profit organizations.
 40 
Table 2. Agreement Distribution 







#ASAs Fraction #ASAs Fraction 
1990 0 0.00% 1 0.04% 
1991 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
1992 0 0.00% 1 0.04% 
1993 2 0.25% 4 0.15% 
1994 9 1.11% 33 1.22% 
1995 23 2.84% 66 2.45% 
1996 47 5.81% 145 5.38% 
1997 69 8.53% 222 8.23% 
1998 54 6.67% 233 8.64% 
1999 58 7.17% 185 6.86% 
2000 38 4.70% 140 5.19% 
2001 40 4.94% 128 4.75% 
2002 36 4.45% 119 4.41% 
2003 52 6.43% 127 4.71% 
2004 44 5.44% 154 5.71% 
2005 43 5.32% 155 5.75% 
2006 52 6.43% 136 5.04% 
2007 40 4.94% 121 4.49% 
2008 18 2.22% 91 3.38% 
2009 28 3.46% 74 2.74% 
2010 22 2.72% 91 3.38% 
2011 21 2.60% 79 2.93% 
2012 23 2.84% 60 2.23% 
2013 23 2.84% 79 2.93% 
2014 22 2.72% 71 2.63% 
2015 22 2.72% 76 2.82% 
2016 14 1.73% 54 2.00% 
2017 9 1.11% 51 1.89% 
Total 809 100% 2,696 100% 




(Table 2 Continued) 
Panel B. Industry Distribution 






#ASAs Fraction #ASAs Fraction 
1. Agriculture 3 0.37% 10 0.37% 
2. Food Products 14 1.73% 44 1.63% 
3. Candy & Soda 0 0.00% 2 0.07% 
4. Beer & Liquor 5 0.62% 17 0.63% 
5. Tobacco Products 0 0.00% 4 0.15% 
6. Recreation 9 1.11% 24 0.89% 
7. Entertainment 7 0.87% 34 1.26% 
8. Printing and Publishing 17 2.10% 37 1.37% 
9. Consumer Goods 8 0.99% 32 1.19% 
10. Apparel 20 2.47% 36 1.34% 
11. Healthcare 33 4.08% 128 4.75% 
12. Medical Equipment 40 4.94% 126 4.67% 
13. Pharmaceutical Products 69 8.53% 217 8.05% 
14. Chemicals 15 1.85% 59 2.19% 
15. Rubber and Plastic Products 9 1.11% 24 0.89% 
16. Textiles 9 1.11% 19 0.70% 
17. Construction Materials 14 1.73% 40 1.48% 
18. Construction 8 0.99% 43 1.59% 
19. Steel Works 9 1.11% 28 1.04% 
20. Fabricated Products 5 0.62% 13 0.48% 
21. Machinery 24 2.97% 79 2.93% 
22. Electrical Equipment 34 4.20% 102 3.78% 
23. Automobiles and Trucks 9 1.11% 33 1.22% 
24. Aircraft 2 0.25% 14 0.52% 
25. Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 0.12% 5 0.19% 
26. Defense 2 0.25% 4 0.15% 
27. Precious Metals 1 0.12% 3 0.11% 
28. Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 3 0.37% 10 0.37% 
29. Coal 1 0.12% 6 0.22% 
30. Petroleum and Natural Gas 20 2.47% 72 2.67% 




(Table 2 Panel B Continued) 
Panel B. Industry Distribution 






#ASAs Fraction #ASAs Fraction 
33. Personal Services 17 2.10% 39 1.45% 
34. Business Services 60 7.42% 230 8.53% 
35. Computers 25 3.09% 82 3.04% 
36. Computer Software 86 10.63% 294 10.91% 
37. Electronic Equipment 74 9.15% 207 7.68% 
38. Measuring and Control Equipment 25 3.09% 76 2.82% 
39. Business Supplies 10 1.24% 37 1.37% 
40. Shipping Containers 1 0.12% 8 0.30% 
41. Transportation 7 0.87% 17 0.63% 
42. Wholesale 38 4.70% 155 5.75% 
43. Retail 35 4.33% 118 4.38% 
44. Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 23 2.84% 75 2.78% 
Others 17 2.10% 93 3.45% 
Total 809 100% 2,696 100% 
	
	
Panel C. SEC Filing Distribution 





#ASAs Fraction #ASAs Fraction 
Current Reports 494 61.06% 1,667 61.83% 
Periodic Reports 262 32.39% 868 32.20% 
Registration Statements 53 6.55% 161 5.97% 
Total 809 100% 2,696 100% 
	
Note: Table 2 reports the distribution of 809 random sample ASAs (direct asset sales 
agreements) and 2,696 full sample ASAs over agreement effective years, Fama-French 49 
industries, and SEC filing types. In Panel A, agreement effective years are the calendar years 
when sellers and buyers enter into direct asset sales agreements. Panel B excludes regulated 
industries (No.31 – Utilities and No.32 – Communication), financial industries (No.45 – 
Banking, No.46 – Insurance, No.47 – Real Estate, and No.48 – Trading), and unidentified 
industries (No.49). In Panel C, current reports include the SEC Filings 6-K, 8-K, and 8-KA; 
periodic reports comprise the SEC Filings 10-K, 10-KA, 10-Q, and 10-QA; registration 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Variables of Sellers' Contracting Mechanisms 
Variable Name #ASAs Mean STD 25% Median 75% 
Accounting Covenants 809 0.3412 0.4744 0 0 1 
Reporting Reps 809 0.3226 0.4678 0 0 1 
Equity Payments 809 0.2015 0.4014 0 0 0 
#Acc_Rep_Equity 809 0.8653 0.8591 0 1 1 
#Acc_Rep 809 0.6638 0.7384 0 1 1 
#Acc_Equity 809 0.5426 0.6418 0 0 1 
#Int_Equity 809 0.5241 0.6212 0 0 1 
D.Acc_Rep_Equity 809 0.0420 0.2008 0 0 0 
D.Acc_Rep 809 0.1607 0.3675 0 0 0 
D.Acc_Equity 809 0.0816 0.2739 0 0 0 
D.Int_Equity 809 0.0680 0.2519 0 0 0 
Panel B. Variables of Buyers' Contracting Mechanisms 
Variable Name #ASAs Mean STD 25% Median 75% 
Financing Covenants 809 0.1248 0.3307 0 0 0 
Liquidity Reps 809 0.2349 0.4242 0 0 0 
Cash Payments 809 0.6082 0.4885 0 1 1 
#Fin_Liq_Cash 809 0.9679 0.7844 0 1 1 
#Fin_Liq 809 0.3597 0.5521 0 0 1 
#Fin_Cash 809 0.7330 0.5869 0 1 1 
#Liq_Cash 809 0.8430 0.7028 0 1 1 
D.Fin_Liq_Cash 809 0.0284 0.1663 0 0 0 
D.Fin_Liq 809 0.0371 0.1891 0 0 0 
D.Fin_Cash 809 0.0742 0.2622 0 0 0 
D.Liq_Cash 809 0.1805 0.3848 0 0 0 




(Table 4 Continued) 
Panel C. Other Variables 
Variable Name #ASAs Mean STD 25% Median 75% 
Private Seller 809 0.3770 0.4849 0 0 1 
Private Buyer 809 0.3337 0.4718 0 0 1 
International Deal 809 0.1211 0.3265 0 0 0 
Price Ratio 809 0.1494 0.2205 0.0255 0.0751 0.1791 
Asset Complexity 809 6.8387 0.7781 6.4457 6.9735 7.3827 
Division Assets 809 0.4363 0.4962 0 0 1 
Redaction 809 0.3449 0.4756 0 0 1 
Current Report 809 0.6106 0.4879 0 1 1 
Distance 809 6.1698 1.9733 5.5386 6.7459 7.5687 
Total Assets 809 5.0578 1.6435 3.8856 4.9730 6.2052 
Tobin's Q 809 2.0432 1.7776 1.1169 1.4703 2.2262 
Altman Z-Score 809 -0.3078 4.7969 -0.8420 1.0902 1.9474 
ROA 809 -0.1072 0.4035 -0.1433 0.0082 0.0708 
Operating Risk 809 0.1510 0.2477 0.0439 0.0831 0.1373 
Firm Age 809 15.3572 11.9473 7 12 20 
	
Note: Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables constructed by analyzing the 
contractual provisions of ASAs (direct asset sales agreements). Panel A (B) presents the 
variables of sellers’ (buyers’) contracting mechanisms, and Panel C shows the other variables 
used in regression analyses. See Appendix A Variable Definitions for the detailed definitions 




Table 5. Individual Contracting Mechanisms 
Panel A. Individual Mechanisms Mitigating Sellers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Accounting Covenants Reporting Reps Equity Payments 
Private Seller 0.3624*** 0.2303** 0.6817*** 
 (3.18) (2.11) (6.17) 
International Deal -0.2141 -0.1674 0.1403 
 (-1.27) (-1.04) (0.82) 
Price Ratio 1.1461*** 0.7758*** 0.0676 
 (4.19) (3.18) (0.27) 
Asset Complexity 0.3121*** 0.3453*** 0.0125 
 (4.22) (4.73) (0.17) 
Division Assets 0.1286 0.2368** 0.1359 
 (1.25) (2.41) (1.24) 
Redaction 0.0013 0.0108 0.0551 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.46) 
Current Report 0.1805* 0.2056** 0.1094 
 (1.73) (2.01) (0.94) 
Distance -0.0050 0.0260 0.0151 
 (-0.20) (1.02) (0.52) 
Total Assets 0.1947*** 0.0136 -0.1305*** 
 (5.00) (0.37) (-3.13) 
Tobin's Q 0.0101 -0.0126 0.0097 
 (0.31) (-0.40) (0.32) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0153 0.0028 0.0018 
 (-0.99) (0.21) (0.13) 
ROA 0.3148 0.0504 -0.0945 
 (1.49) (0.30) (-0.60) 
Operating Risk -0.4089* -0.1542 -0.2155 
 (-1.83) (-0.67) (-1.00) 
Firm Age -0.0022 0.0016 -0.0133** 
 (-0.51) (0.36) (-2.53) 
Intercept -3.9069*** -3.4749*** -0.6573 
  (-7.31) (-6.51) (-1.20) 
N 809 809 809 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 0.065 0.087 
Marginal Pr(Private Seller) +11.67% +7.69% +17.5% 
Model Type Probit Probit Probit 
Industry FE No No No 
Year FE No No No 
(Continued on the next page) 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
Panel B. Individual Mechanisms Mitigating Buyers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Financing Covenants Liquidity Reps Cash Payments 
Private Buyer 0.3798*** 0.2233** 0.3513*** 
 (2.97) (1.98) (3.37) 
International Deal 0.1198 -0.0347 -0.3824** 
 (0.60) (-0.20) (-2.52) 
Price Ratio 1.2856*** 0.4914* 0.2369 
 (4.89) (1.96) (1.02) 
Asset Complexity 0.0863 0.4106*** 0.0012 
 (1.06) (4.75) (0.02) 
Division Assets 0.1341 -0.1687 -0.1437 
 (1.05) (-1.53) (-1.55) 
Redaction -0.1895 0.2121* -0.1968* 
 (-1.41) (1.92) (-1.90) 
Current Report 0.1154 0.1219 0.1511 
 (0.88) (1.06) (1.47) 
Distance -0.0513* 0.0160 0.0311 
 (-1.68) (0.59) (1.21) 
Total Assets 0.1961*** 0.1862*** 0.2403*** 
 (4.15) (4.74) (6.21) 
Tobin's Q 0.0048 -0.0634* -0.0291 
 (0.10) (-1.73) (-1.02) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0002 -0.0306** -0.0143 
 (-0.01) (-2.18) (-1.09) 
ROA -0.2122 0.2341 -0.0244 
 (-0.83) (1.15) (-0.16) 
Operating Risk -0.4775* 0.1338 -0.3542* 
 (-1.86) (0.54) (-1.69) 
Firm Age -0.0037 0.0131*** 0.0039 
 (-0.73) (2.82) (0.85) 
Intercept -2.8345*** -4.9989*** -1.1338** 
  (-4.36) (-7.99) (-2.36) 
N 809 809 809 
Pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.145 0.079 
Marginal Pr(Private Buyer) +7.02% +5.83% +12.37% 
Model Type Probit Probit Probit 
Industry FE No No No 






Note: Table 5 reports the use of individual contracting mechanisms to mitigate the information 
frictions of direct asset sales. Panel A (B) shows association between the severity of seller-side 
(buyer-side) information frictions and the choice of different contracting mechanisms. In Panel 
A (B), Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on a Probit model. The dependent variables in Panel 
A (B) are the indicator variables, which equal 1 if direct asset sales agreements use accounting 
(financing) covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, or equity (cash) payments. In Panel A (B), the 
variable Private Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. All 
the variables are defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. The marginal probability row of 
Panel A (B) denotes the incremental likelihood of implementing accounting (financing) 
covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, or equity (cash) payments if direct asset sales involve 
private sellers (buyers). Standard errors are clustered by filer firms. Z-statistics are presented 
inside the parentheses below the Probit regression coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 





































Table 6. Complementary Contracting Mechanisms 
Panel A. Mechanisms Mitigating Seller-Side Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  #Acc_Rep_Equity #Acc_Rep #Acc_Equity #Rep_Equity 
Private Seller 0.4075*** 0.2077*** 0.3293*** 0.2780*** 
 (5.81) (3.43) (6.40) (5.58) 
International Deal -0.0821 -0.1178 -0.0236 -0.0227 
 (-0.79) (-1.42) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
Price Ratio 0.7370*** 0.7079*** 0.4441*** 0.3220*** 
 (4.83) (5.05) (3.58) (3.18) 
Asset Complexity 0.1914*** 0.1867*** 0.0917*** 0.1042*** 
 (4.75) (5.57) (2.91) (3.58) 
Division Assets 0.1193* 0.0978* 0.0503 0.0906* 
 (1.91) (1.87) (1.03) (1.94) 
Redaction 0.0466 0.0132 0.0467 0.0332 
 (0.68) (0.23) (0.91) (0.66) 
Current Report 0.1495** 0.1195** 0.0807* 0.0989** 
 (2.41) (2.24) (1.70) (2.14) 
Distance 0.0061 0.0040 -0.0017 0.0099 
 (0.42) (0.31) (-0.16) (0.90) 
Total Assets 0.0530** 0.0796*** 0.0430** -0.0165 
 (2.30) (3.98) (2.49) (-1.00) 
Tobin's Q 0.0070 0.0047 0.0075 0.0018 
 (0.37) (0.33) (0.51) (0.12) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0059 -0.0049 -0.0070 -0.0000 
 (-0.82) (-0.86) (-1.22) (-0.01) 
ROA 0.0488 0.0920 0.0387 -0.0330 
 (0.57) (1.40) (0.59) (-0.45) 
Operating Risk -0.2165** -0.1429* -0.1574* -0.1328 
 (-2.08) (-1.77) (-1.76) (-1.53) 
Company Age -0.0008 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 (-0.30) (0.41) (-0.63) (-0.68) 
Intercept -0.9898*** -1.0104*** -0.5779 -0.3912 
  (-2.77) (-3.65) (-1.46) (-0.67) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Adj. R-squared 0.120 0.139 0.085 0.075 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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(Table 6 Continued) 
Panel B. Mechanisms Mitigating Buyer-Side Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  #Fin_Liq_Cash #Fin_Liq #Fin_Cash #Liq_Cash 
Private Buyer 0.2419*** 0.1268*** 0.1849*** 0.1720*** 
 (4.51) (3.15) (4.20) (3.61) 
International Deal -0.0989 0.0203 -0.0688 -0.1493** 
 (-1.24) (0.34) (-1.05) (-2.04) 
Price Ratio 0.5263*** 0.4479*** 0.3719*** 0.2327* 
 (4.38) (4.65) (3.82) (1.91) 
Asset Complexity 0.0893** 0.0938*** 0.0139 0.0710** 
 (2.50) (4.17) (0.47) (2.16) 
Division Assets -0.0690 -0.0168 -0.0355 -0.0857* 
 (-1.30) (-0.45) (-0.88) (-1.72) 
Redaction -0.0755 -0.0015 -0.0994** -0.0502 
 (-1.31) (-0.04) (-2.24) (-0.92) 
Current Report 0.1006* 0.0408 0.0787* 0.0816 
 (1.81) (1.00) (1.86) (1.62) 
Distance 0.0038 -0.0094 0.0022 0.0148 
 (0.30) (-1.02) (0.21) (1.18) 
Total Assets 0.1707*** 0.0841*** 0.1222*** 0.1350*** 
 (9.34) (5.99) (8.18) (8.02) 
Tobin's Q -0.0130 -0.0028 -0.0058 -0.0175 
 (-0.85) (-0.27) (-0.43) (-1.28) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0117 -0.0035 -0.0090 -0.0108 
 (-1.59) (-0.82) (-1.52) (-1.55) 
ROA -0.0387 -0.0397 -0.0419 0.0044 
 (-0.51) (-0.74) (-0.63) (0.06) 
Operating Risk -0.1861** -0.0490 -0.2095** -0.1136 
 (-2.00) (-0.80) (-2.44) (-1.30) 
Company Age 0.0027 0.0019 0.0010 0.0026 
 (1.16) (1.05) (0.54) (1.19) 
Intercept -0.5398 -0.5122 0.2044 -0.7718 
  (-0.52) (-0.88) (0.22) (-1.23) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Adj. R-squared 0.227 0.211 0.144 0.177 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Note: Table 6 reports the use of complementary contracting mechanisms to mitigate the 
information frictions of direct asset sales. Panel A (B) shows association between the severity 
of seller-side (buyer-side) information frictions and the use of complementary mechanisms, 
which can include accounting (financing) covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, or equity (cash) 
payments. All the regression analyses of Panel A and B are based on an OLS model in which 
year and industry fixed effects are controlled. The dependent variable #Acc_Rep_Equity 
(#Fin_Liq_Cash) of Panel A (B) equals 0, 1, 2, or 3, measuring the choice of the three 
contracting mechanisms that sellers (buyers) comply with. Similarly, the other dependent 
variables of Panel A (B) equal 0, 1, or 2, measuring the choice of the two contracting 
mechanisms that sellers (buyers) comply with. In Panel A (B), the variable Private Seller 
(Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix A Variable Definitions. Standard errors are clustered by filer firms. T-statistics are 
presented inside the parentheses below the OLS regression coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 





Table 7. Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity 
Panel A. Complementary Mechanisms Mitigating Sellers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  D.Acc_Rep_Equity D.Acc_Rep D.Acc_Equity D.Rep_Equity 
Private Seller 0.7362*** 0.3295** 0.8310*** 0.6742*** 
 (3.97) (2.39) (5.72) (4.39) 
International Deal 0.3913* -0.0746 0.1448 0.2530 
 (1.65) (-0.39) (0.68) (1.21) 
Price Ratio 0.6462* 1.0745*** 0.7111** -0.0701 
 (1.91) (3.94) (2.42) (-0.22) 
Asset Complexity 0.0332 0.2315*** 0.1726* 0.0557 
 (0.29) (2.60) (1.68) (0.59) 
Division Assets 0.3058* 0.2697** 0.2744** 0.2634* 
 (1.74) (2.19) (1.98) (1.82) 
Redaction 0.4007** 0.0277 0.2315 0.3399** 
 (2.31) (0.22) (1.56) (2.30) 
Current Report 0.4326** 0.2415** 0.2788* 0.5403*** 
 (2.33) (2.04) (1.87) (3.46) 
Distance 0.0082 0.0014 0.0100 0.0242 
 (0.20) (0.05) (0.29) (0.65) 
Total Assets 0.0101 0.1425*** -0.0686 -0.0544 
 (0.16) (3.10) (-1.26) (-1.01) 
Tobin's Q 0.0679 0.0378 0.0333 -0.0048 
 (1.37) (1.03) (0.83) (-0.11) 
Altman Z-Score 0.0094 0.0029 -0.0000 -0.0139 
 (0.36) (0.18) (-0.00) (-0.65) 
ROA 0.3690 0.2424 0.4037* 0.1084 
 (1.24) (1.09) (1.92) (0.43) 
Operating Risk -0.2389 -0.5553* -0.1948 -0.1315 
 (-0.68) (-1.92) (-0.64) (-0.54) 
Firm Age 0.0023 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0101 
 (0.34) (-0.10) (-0.11) (-1.36) 
Intercept -3.3338*** -3.9299*** -3.2528*** -2.5475*** 
  (-3.68) (-5.89) (-4.54) (-3.56) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.096 0.118 0.101 
Marginal  
Pr(Private Seller) +5.8% +7.26% +11.11% +7.99% 
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Industry FE No No No No 
Year FE No No No No 
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(Table 7 Continued) 
Panel B. Complementary Mechanisms Mitigating Buyers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  D.Fin_Liq_Cash D.Fin_Liq D.Fin_Cash D.Liq_Cash 
Private Buyer 0.4992** 0.4880*** 0.5395*** 0.1702 
 (2.26) (2.61) (3.58) (1.41) 
International Deal -0.8211 -0.3540 -0.0958 -0.4373** 
 (-1.51) (-0.86) (-0.39) (-2.19) 
Price Ratio 1.1427*** 1.3167*** 1.0519*** 0.5421** 
 (2.80) (3.59) (3.51) (2.01) 
Asset Complexity 0.5712** 0.4462** 0.0885 0.4610*** 
 (2.28) (2.38) (0.83) (4.42) 
Division Assets -0.1308 -0.1099 0.1058 -0.1641 
 (-0.62) (-0.57) (0.71) (-1.41) 
Redaction -0.0658 -0.1105 -0.3214** 0.1122 
 (-0.30) (-0.54) (-2.06) (0.93) 
Current Report 0.0514 0.0690 0.1894 0.2472** 
 (0.23) (0.34) (1.20) (1.97) 
Distance 0.0579 0.0208 -0.0178 0.0407 
 (1.11) (0.44) (-0.51) (1.35) 
Total Assets 0.3489*** 0.2943*** 0.3082*** 0.2192*** 
 (4.72) (4.50) (5.78) (5.26) 
Tobin's Q -0.2649** -0.2320* 0.0381 -0.0598 
 (-2.01) (-1.87) (0.57) (-1.40) 
Altman Z-Score 0.0431 0.0374 -0.0185 -0.0471*** 
 (1.28) (0.89) (-0.68) (-2.99) 
ROA -0.7923*** -0.4811 0.5506 0.2003 
 (-3.02) (-1.17) (1.25) (0.80) 
Operating Risk -0.1706 -0.2775 -0.0792 -0.9178** 
 (-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.26) (-2.23) 
Firm Age -0.0064 -0.0003 -0.0063 0.0081* 
 (-0.88) (-0.05) (-1.02) (1.72) 
Intercept -8.2460*** -6.8000*** -4.0316*** -5.7085*** 
  (-3.98) (-4.48) (-4.76) (-7.73) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Pseudo R-squared 0.265 0.234 0.150 0.175 
Marginal  
Pr(Private Buyer) +2.51% +3.14% +6.51% +3.69% 
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Industry FE No No No No 
Year FE No No No No 
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Note: Table 7 reports the prevalence of mechanism complementarity in direct asset sales. Panel 
A (B) shows association between the severity of seller-side (buyer-side) information frictions 
and the use of complementary contracting mechanisms, which include accounting (financing) 
covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, and equity (cash) payments. In Panel A (B), Columns (1), 
(2), (3), and (4) are based on a Probit model. The dependent variable D.Acc_Rep_Equity 
(D.Fin_Liq_Cash) of Panel A (B) is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if direct asset sales 
agreements impose the three contracting mechanisms on sellers (buyers) in the same contracts. 
The other dependent variables of Panel A (B) are also indicator variables equal to 1 if direct 
asset sales agreements use a pair of contracting mechanisms for sellers (buyers). In Panel A 
(B), the variable Private Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held 
firms. All the variables are defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. Standard errors are 
clustered by filer firms. Z-statistics are presented inside the parentheses below the Probit 
regression coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5%, 





Table 8. Relationship between Payment and Non-Payment Mechanisms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Equity payments  1.3237***   
  (3.49)   
Cash payments    1.5045*** 
    (13.77) 
Post SFAS 141 -0.5880***  0.3510***  
 (-4.12)  (3.62)  
Private Seller 0.7234*** 0.0213   
 (6.64) (0.14)   
Private Buyer   0.3392*** 0.0376 
   (3.28) (0.37) 
International Deal 0.1029 -0.3122** -0.3754** 0.2886* 
 (0.60) (-2.14) (-2.41) (1.96) 
Price Ratio 0.0148 1.0619*** 0.2607 0.6445*** 
 (0.06) (3.35) (1.14) (2.79) 
Asset Complexity -0.0004 0.3798*** -0.0370 0.2081*** 
 (-0.01) (4.58) (-0.56) (3.16) 
Division Assets 0.1182 0.0929 -0.1418 0.0434 
 (1.07) (0.95) (-1.57) (0.50) 
Redaction 0.1515 -0.0253 -0.2733*** 0.1693* 
 (1.25) (-0.26) (-2.64) (1.79) 
Current Report 0.1615 0.1428 0.1447 0.0222 
 (1.39) (1.40) (1.43) (0.23) 
Distance 0.0159 0.0116 0.0291 -0.0389 
 (0.55) (0.47) (1.15) (-1.62) 
Total Assets -0.1170*** 0.1407*** 0.2299*** 0.0309 
 (-2.76) (4.07) (5.95) (0.77) 
Tobin's Q 0.0029 -0.0219 -0.0181 0.0056 
 (0.09) (-0.78) (-0.62) (0.18) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0066 -0.0105 -0.0126 -0.0110 
 (-0.48) (-0.82) (-1.03) (-0.98) 
ROA -0.1032 0.2031 0.0359 0.0629 
 (-0.70) (1.27) (0.22) (0.36) 
Operating Risk -0.2212 -0.1228 -0.3613* 0.1608 
 (-1.02) (-0.60) (-1.70) (0.72) 
Firm Age -0.0090* 0.0035 0.0009 0.0046 
 (-1.73) (0.85) (0.20) (1.16) 
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Intercept -0.6549 -3.8573*** -0.8387* -2.9803*** 
  (-1.15) (-6.50) (-1.72) (-5.61) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Model Type Bivariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
 
Note: Table 8 analyzes the relationship between payment and non-payment mechanisms of 
direct asset sales agreements. Columns (1) and (2) show the two equations of a bivariate Probit 
model, which take into account the endogenous selection of equity payments as part of special 
payment arrangements. Columns (3) and (4) present the two equations of another bivariate 
Probit model, which account for the endogenous inclusion of cash payments into special 
payment arrangements. Equity Payments is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the payment 
arrangements rely on equity. Cash Payments is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the payment 
arrangements specify cash but excludes other delayed payments, such as equity payments, 
promissory notes payments, and contingent payments. Post SFAS 141 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the agreement became effective after January 1, 2009. The indicator variable 
Private Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. Standard errors are clustered by filer 
firms. Z-statistics are presented inside the parentheses below the Probit regression coefficients. 




Table 9. Expected Contract Duration 
  (1) (2) (3) 





Intercept 0.7695*** 2.3351** 1.9159* 
 (5.88) (2.36) (1.93) 
Price Ratio -0.5276** 2.4318*** 2.5457*** 
 (-2.53) (4.43) (4.66) 
Inventory -0.1539   
 (-1.51)   
#Buyer Reps -0.0577***   
 (-3.15)   
Accounting Covenants  0.5419***  
  (3.06)  
Financing Covenants   0.5452** 
   (2.32) 
Private Seller  -0.1148  
  (-0.65)  
Private Buyer   -0.2028 
   (-1.22) 
International Deal  0.3612 0.3076 
  (1.38) (1.19) 
Asset Complexity  -0.1257 -0.1068 
  (-1.04) (-0.88) 
Division Assets  0.1768 0.1834 
  (1.05) (1.09) 
Redaction  0.0160 0.0213 
  (0.09) (0.12) 
Current Report  -0.0574 -0.0287 
  (-0.34) (-0.17) 
Distance  0.0001 -0.0004 
  (0.00) (-0.01) 
Total Assets  0.3607*** 0.3728*** 
  (5.96) (6.32) 
Tobin's Q  -0.0179 -0.0269 
  (-0.35) (-0.51) 
Altman Z-Score  -0.0187 -0.0264 
  (-0.74) (-1.09) 
ROA  -0.0228 0.0465 
  (-0.10) (0.21) 
Operating Risk  -0.5564* -0.5943* 
  (-1.86) (-1.93) 
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Firm Age  0.0118 0.0128* 
  (1.56) (1.67) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.4332 -0.2815 
    (-0.41) (-0.27) 
N 809 481 481 
Pseudo/Adj. R-squared 0.022 0.156 0.149 
Model Type Probit OLS OLS 
Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table 9 reports the determinants of the expected contract duration of direct asset sales 
agreements. Based on OLS models, Columns (2) and (3) comprise the inverse mills ratio 
calculated by the Heckman selection model listed in Column (1). Expected Closing Date is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the agreement explicitly specifies the date by which the 
transaction is expected to close. Expected Contract Duration is the logarithm value of the 
number of days between the agreement effective date and the expected closing date. Price 
Ratio is the ratio of the purchase price of the direct asset sales to the total assets of the filer 
firm. The indicator variable Inventory equals 1 if the agreement contains inventory-related 
representations and warranties. #Buyer Reps describes the number of representations and 
warranties that buyers comply with. When accounting (financing) covenants are specified by 
the agreement, the indicator variable Accounting (Financing) Covenants is equal to 1. Private 
Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. Standard errors are clustered by filer firms. Z-
statistics (T-statistics) are presented inside the parentheses below the Probit (OLS) regression 












































































































Note: Figure A1 describes the year distribution of the collected direct asset sales agreements. 
The year refers to the agreement effective year. Figure A2 presents the industry distribution of 
the collected direct asset sales agreements. The industry classification is based on Fama-French 
48 industries. Figure A3 reports the distribution by the SEC Form. In each figure, the solid bar 
represents the random sample, which includes 809 agreements, and the blank bar stands for the 













































Table A1. Individual Contracting Mechanisms 
Robustness Test after Controlling for Fixed Effects 
 
Panel A. Individual Mechanisms Mitigating Sellers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Accounting Covenants Reporting Reps Equity Payments 
Private Seller 0.1295*** 0.0782** 0.1998*** 
 (3.46) (2.05) (6.25) 
International Deal -0.0594 -0.0585 0.0358 
 (-1.11) (-1.10) (0.79) 
Price Ratio 0.4150*** 0.2929*** 0.0291 
 (4.52) (3.20) (0.40) 
Asset Complexity 0.0871*** 0.0996*** 0.0046 
 (4.07) (4.72) (0.22) 
Division Assets 0.0288 0.0691** 0.0215 
 (0.81) (2.00) (0.68) 
Redaction 0.0134 -0.0002 0.0333 
 (0.37) (-0.00) (1.04) 
Current Report 0.0506 0.0689** 0.0301 
 (1.44) (1.99) (0.97) 
Distance -0.0038 0.0078 0.0021 
 (-0.46) (0.92) (0.29) 
Total Assets 0.0696*** 0.0100 -0.0266*** 
 (5.43) (0.76) (-2.61) 
Tobin's Q 0.0052 -0.0005 0.0023 
 (0.55) (-0.05) (0.24) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0059 0.0010 -0.0011 
 (-1.51) (0.25) (-0.25) 
ROA 0.0819* 0.0101 -0.0432 
 (1.87) (0.22) (-0.84) 
Operating Risk -0.0837 -0.0591 -0.0736 
 (-1.64) (-0.88) (-1.17) 
Firm Age 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0018 
 (0.30) (0.32) (-1.55) 
Intercept -0.5985 -0.4119 0.0207 
  (-1.33) (-0.93) (0.10) 
N 809 809 809 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.063 0.072 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 




(Table A1 Continued) 
Panel B. Individual Mechanisms Mitigating Buyers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Financing Covenants Liquidity Reps Cash Payments 
Private Buyer 0.0699*** 0.0569* 0.1151*** 
 (2.64) (1.86) (3.18) 
International Deal 0.0504 -0.0301 -0.1192** 
 (1.31) (-0.63) (-2.14) 
Price Ratio 0.2936*** 0.1544** 0.0784 
 (3.89) (2.02) (0.90) 
Asset Complexity 0.0183 0.0755*** -0.0044 
 (1.21) (4.38) (-0.17) 
Division Assets 0.0167 -0.0335 -0.0522 
 (0.68) (-1.14) (-1.46) 
Redaction -0.0253 0.0238 -0.0740* 
 (-0.98) (0.72) (-1.90) 
Current Report 0.0190 0.0218 0.0597 
 (0.77) (0.72) (1.59) 
Distance -0.0110 0.0016 0.0132 
 (-1.62) (0.22) (1.40) 
Total Assets 0.0357*** 0.0484*** 0.0866*** 
 (3.88) (4.47) (6.67) 
Tobin's Q 0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0102 
 (0.54) (-1.13) (-0.90) 
Altman Z-Score -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0081 
 (-0.32) (-0.75) (-1.54) 
ROA -0.0430 0.0033 0.0011 
 (-1.04) (0.10) (0.02) 
Operating Risk -0.0725** 0.0235 -0.1370* 
 (-2.30) (0.47) (-1.70) 
Firm Age 0.0002 0.0017 0.0008 
 (0.14) (1.18) (0.54) 
Intercept 0.2320 -0.7442*** -0.0276 
  (0.49) (-4.05) (-0.05) 
N 809 809 809 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.187 0.075 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 





Note: Table A1 reports the use of individual contracting mechanisms to mitigate the 
information frictions of direct asset sales. Panel A (B) shows association between the severity 
of seller-side (buyer-side) information frictions and the choice of different contracting 
mechanisms. In Panel A (B), Columns (1), (2), and (3) rely on an OLS model in which year 
and industry fixed effects are controlled. The dependent variables in Panel A (B) are the 
indicator variables, which equal 1 if direct asset sales agreements use accounting (financing) 
covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, or equity (cash) payments. In Panel A (B), the variable 
Private Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. The marginal probability row of 
Panel A (B) denotes the incremental likelihood of implementing accounting (financing) 
covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, or equity (cash) payments if direct asset sales involve 
private sellers (buyers). Standard errors are clustered by filer firms. T-statistics are presented 
inside the parentheses below the OLS regression coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 




Table A2. Prevalence of Mechanism Complementarity 
Robustness Test after Controlling for Fixed Effects 
 
Panel A. Complementary Mechanisms Mitigating Sellers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  D.Acc_Rep_Equity D.Acc_Rep D.Acc_Equity D.Rep_Equity 
Private Seller 0.0682*** 0.0771** 0.1270*** 0.0909*** 
 (3.66) (2.40) (5.32) (4.04) 
International Deal 0.0320 -0.0176 0.0266 0.0305 
 (1.21) (-0.44) (0.86) (0.96) 
Price Ratio 0.0630 0.2711*** 0.1138* -0.0033 
 (1.60) (3.37) (1.89) (-0.08) 
Asset Complexity 0.0013 0.0369** 0.0211 0.0073 
 (0.14) (2.24) (1.61) (0.61) 
Division Assets 0.0228 0.0488* 0.0352 0.0291 
 (1.41) (1.79) (1.61) (1.42) 
Redaction 0.0328* -0.0015 0.0408* 0.0453** 
 (1.79) (-0.05) (1.75) (2.08) 
Current Report 0.0300** 0.0438* 0.0308 0.0586*** 
 (2.13) (1.65) (1.52) (3.33) 
Distance -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0014 
 (-0.18) (-0.07) (-0.04) (0.31) 
Total Assets 0.0037 0.0348*** -0.0054 -0.0029 
 (0.71) (3.29) (-0.72) (-0.46) 
Tobin's Q 0.0069 0.0116* 0.0050 -0.0008 
 (1.37) (1.72) (0.81) (-0.13) 
Altman Z-Score 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0014 
 (0.57) (0.14) (-0.52) (-0.53) 
ROA 0.0187 0.0301 0.0416* 0.0020 
 (1.07) (1.06) (1.83) (0.06) 
Operating Risk -0.0215 -0.0743** -0.0283 -0.0259 
 (-1.06) (-2.30) (-0.74) (-0.82) 
Firm Age 0.0004 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.60) (0.08) (0.77) (-0.91) 
Intercept -0.1065 -0.4883*** -0.2805** -0.1571 
  (-1.20) (-3.30) (-2.50) (-1.39) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.062 0.051 0.021 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Continued on the next page) 
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(Table A2 Continued) 
Panel B. Complementary Mechanisms Mitigating Buyers' Information Frictions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  D.Fin_Liq_Cash D.Fin_Liq D.Fin_Cash D.Liq_Cash 
Private Buyer 0.0244* 0.0328** 0.0635*** 0.0380 
 (1.71) (2.10) (2.87) (1.37) 
International Deal -0.0242 -0.0221 0.0183 -0.1054*** 
 (-1.64) (-1.17) (0.63) (-2.70) 
Price Ratio 0.0518 0.0978** 0.1052* 0.1372** 
 (1.63) (2.37) (1.89) (1.98) 
Asset Complexity 0.0159** 0.0147** 0.0131 0.0640*** 
 (2.35) (1.96) (1.06) (4.09) 
Division Assets -0.0107 -0.0129 0.0013 -0.0313 
 (-0.97) (-1.01) (0.07) (-1.18) 
Redaction -0.0142 -0.0152 -0.0307 0.0020 
 (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.60) (0.07) 
Current Report -0.0027 -0.0043 0.0295 0.0412 
 (-0.21) (-0.29) (1.54) (1.50) 
Distance 0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0024 0.0072 
 (0.80) (-0.02) (-0.51) (1.09) 
Total Assets 0.0181*** 0.0218*** 0.0356*** 0.0541*** 
 (3.82) (3.86) (4.85) (5.62) 
Tobin's Q -0.0021 -0.0024 0.0040 -0.0029 
 (-1.01) (-0.99) (0.65) (-0.51) 
Altman Z-Score 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0064* 
 (0.43) (0.86) (-1.27) (-1.89) 
ROA -0.0208*** -0.0211** 0.0131 -0.0140 
 (-2.60) (-2.16) (0.65) (-0.51) 
Operating Risk -0.0087 -0.0107 -0.0150 -0.0879*** 
 (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.64) (-2.80) 
Firm Age 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.02) (0.72) (-0.45) (0.40) 
Intercept -0.1811*** -0.1812*** 0.2710 -0.7236*** 
  (-2.96) (-2.58) (0.65) (-4.57) 
N 809 809 809 809 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.072 0.094 0.178 
Model Type OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Note: Table A2 reports the prevalence of mechanism complementarity in direct asset sales. 
Panel A (B) shows association between the severity of seller-side (buyer-side) information 
frictions and the use of complementary contracting mechanisms, which include accounting 
(financing) covenants, reporting (liquidity) reps, and equity (cash) payments. In Panel A (B), 
Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) rely on an OLS model in which year and industry fixed effects 
are controlled. The dependent variable D.Acc_Rep_Equity (D.Fin_Liq_Cash) of Panel A (B) 
is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if direct asset sales agreements impose the three 
contracting mechanisms on sellers (buyers) in the same contracts. The other dependent 
variables of Panel A (B) are also indicator variables equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements 
use a pair of contracting mechanisms for sellers (buyers). In Panel A (B), the variable Private 
Seller (Private Buyer) equals 1 if sellers (buyers) are privately held firms. All the variables are 
defined in Appendix A Variable Definitions. Standard errors are clustered by filer firms. T-
statistics are presented inside the parentheses below the OLS regression coefficients. *, **, and 




Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
A.1 Variables of Sellers’ Contracting Mechanisms 
• Accounting Covenants: an indicator variable equal to 1 if sellers are regulated by 
accounting covenants, which require sellers to deliver post-contract financial 
information or forbid sellers to arbitrarily modify accounting policies. 
• Reporting Reps: an indicator variable equal to 1 if sellers make representations and 
warranties regarding their pre-contract interim financial information, which is defined 
as the unaudited financial information of an interim period prior to the agreement 
effective date. 
• Equity Payments: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the payment arrangements specify 
equity payments. 
• #Acc_Rep_Equity: equal to 0, 1, 2, or 3 and capturing the number of sellers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as accounting covenants, reporting reps, and equity payments. 
• #Acc_Rep: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of sellers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as accounting covenants and reporting reps. 
• #Acc_Equity: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of sellers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as accounting covenants and equity payments. 
• #Rep_Equity: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of sellers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as reporting reps and equity payments. 
• D.Acc_Rep_Equity: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements 
include sellers’ contracting mechanisms, such as accounting covenants, reporting reps, 
and equity payments. 
• D.Acc_Rep: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
sellers’ contracting mechanisms, such as accounting covenants and reporting reps. 
• D.Acc_Equity: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
sellers’ contracting mechanisms, such as accounting covenants and equity payments. 
• D.Rep_Equity: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
sellers’ contracting mechanisms, such as reporting reps and equity payments. 
 
A.2 Variables of Buyers’ Contracting Mechanisms 
• Financing Covenants: an indicator variable equal to 1 if buyers are regulated by 
financing covenants, which require buyers to prepare adequate funds before closing 
direct asset sales. 
• Liquidity Reps: an indicator variable equal to 1 if buyers do not make equity payments, 
do not make representations and warranties about their capitalization, but make 
representations and warranties about their pre-contract liquidity condition, which 
typically specifies that buyers have sufficient funds or have entered into credit 
arrangements. 
• Cash Payments: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the payment arrangements require 
the entire purchase price to be paid in cash and exclude delayed payments, such as 
equity payments, promissory notes payments, and contingent payments. 
• #Fin_Liq_Cash: equal to 0, 1, 2, or 3 and capturing the number of buyers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as financing covenants, liquidity reps, and cash payments. 
• #Fin_Liq: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of buyers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as financing covenants and liquidity reps. 
• #Fin_Cash: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of buyers’ contracting 
mechanisms, such as financing covenants and cash payments. 
• #Liq_Cash: equal to 0, 1, or 2 and capturing the number of buyers’ contracting 
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mechanisms, such as liquidity reps and cash payments. 
• D.Fin_Liq_Cash: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements 
include buyers’ contracting mechanisms, such as financing covenants, liquidity reps, 
and cash payments. 
• D.Fin_Liq: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
buyers’ contracting mechanisms, such as financing covenants and liquidity reps. 
• D.Fin_Cash: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
buyers’ contracting mechanisms, such as financing covenants and cash payments. 
• D.Liq_Cash: an indicator variable equal to 1 if direct asset sales agreements include 
buyers’ contracting mechanisms, such as liquidity reps and cash payments. 
 
A.3 Other Variables 
• Private Seller: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the seller is a privately held firm. 
• Private Buyer: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the buyer is a privately held firm. 
• International Deal: an indicator variable equal to 1 if either the buyer or the seller is an 
international firm. 
• Price Ratio: the ratio of the purchase price of the direct asset sales to the total assets of 
the filer firm. 
• Asset Complexity: the logarithm value of the number of words that describe the target 
assets’ components. 
• Division Assets: an indicator variable equal to 1 if target assets constitute a subsidiary, 
a division, or a segment. 
• Redaction: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the filer firm redacts certain information 
in direct asset sales agreements. 
• Current Report: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the filer firm discloses the direct asset 
sales agreement through an SEC current report. 
• Distance: the logarithm value of the number of miles between the headquarters of the 
seller and the buyer. 
• Total Assets: the logarithm value of the filer firm’s total assets. 
• Tobin’s Q: the filer firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio calculated by dividing assets’ market value 
by assets’ book value. 
• Altman Z-Score: the filer firm’s Altman Z-score calculated by following the formula of 
Leary and Roberts (2014). 
• ROA: the filer firm’s return on total assets, the ratio calculated as dividing net income 
by total assets. 
• Operating Risk: the volatility of the filer firm’s operating cash flow within the past five 
years prior to the agreement effective date. 
• Firm Age: the filer firm’s age calculated by subtracting the year of the firms’ initial 




Appendix B: Examples of Contracting Mechanisms 
 
B.1 Accounting Covenants (Sellers) 
(1) Financial Information Delivery 
 “Seller shall prepare and deliver to Buyer unaudited financial information of the Business, 
including income statements for the relevant period and balance sheets as of the last day of the 
relevant period, prepared on a basis consistent with the assumptions and basis of presentation 
of the special purpose financial statements for the Business for the fiscal years ended December 
31, 2015 and 2016 that were audited and delivered to Buyer on September 1, 2017 (the 
“Audited Financials”), for (1) each of Seller’s 2017 fiscal quarters that ended prior to the 
Closing Date (the “Quarterly Financials”) and (2) the period beginning on the day after the 
last day of the immediately preceding fiscal quarter and ending on the Closing Date (the “Stub 
Period Financials”). Seller shall deliver the Quarterly Financials no later than January 31, 
2018; provided, however, that if the Closing Date is on or after December 31, 2017, Seller shall 
deliver the financial information for its fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2017 no later than 
sixty (60) days after the Closing Date. Seller shall deliver the Stub Period Financials (y) if the 
Closing Date is on or before October 31, 2017, no later than December 11, 2017, or (z) if the 
Closing Date is after October 31, 2017, no later than sixty (60) days after the Closing Date. 
Subject to the other provisions of this Section 4.18, Seller shall provide such financial 
statements and information (audited or unaudited, as the case may be) related to the pre-
Closing Business, at such times, as Buyer reasonably requires to timely comply with its 
obligations under Rules 3-05 and 1-02(w) of Regulation S-X and cooperate reasonably with 
Buyer in connection with those statements and information.” 
(CIK: 711404; Filer Company: Cooper Companies Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: 
September 12, 2017; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 4.18 Financial Statements) 
“Seller shall prepare, or cause the preparation of, in accordance with GAAP, and deliver to 
Buyer within 30 days following the Closing, such additional audited and unaudited Acquired 
Business Balance Sheets, Acquired Business Statements of Operations and Acquired Business 
Statements of Cash Flows as may be required to enable Parent to complete and file its Form 
8-K under the Exchange Act relating to the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, 
together with, in the case of any audited Acquired Business Balance Sheet, Acquired Business 
Statements of Operations and Acquired Business Statements of Cash Flows, the manually 
signed accountants' report of Arthur Andersen L.L.P. covering such audited financial 
statements.” 
(CIK: 852637; Filer Company: Brite Voice Systems Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: 
November 7, 1997; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 7.7 Financial Statements) 
(2) Accounting Policy Change 
“Maintain Sellers' books of account, records and files substantially in the same manner as they 
are maintained as of the date of this Agreement and make no material change in accounting 
principles from those followed in the preparation of the Financial Statements;” 
(CIK: 5657; Filer Company: American Precision Industries Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: 
May 3, 1996; Exhibit: 2; Section 3.3 Affirmative Covenants of Sellers) 
 
B.2 Financial Information Reps (Sellers) 
(1) Interim Financial Information (Reporting Reps) 
“Attached as collective Paragraph 4(c) to the Seller's Disclosure Letter are the following 
financial statements (collectively the "Financial Statements"): (i)…and (ii) unaudited balance 
sheet and statement of income (the "Most Recent Financial Statements") as of and for the 
month ended May 31, 1996 (the "Most Recent Fiscal Month End") for the Seller.” 
(CIK: 763098; Filer Company: Response Oncology Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: October 
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21, 1996; Exhibit: 10.Y; Section 4(c) Financial Statements) 
(2) Carve-out Financial Information (Fiscal Financial Information) 
“Section 3.5 of the Company Disclosure Schedules sets forth a statement of profits and losses 
with respect to each Acquired Store for the twelve-month period ended April 29, 2017 
(collectively, the “Financial Statements”). The Financial Statements collectively present fairly, 
in all material respects, the results of operations of the applicable Acquired Store at their 
respective dates and for the periods covered by such statements, which are in conformity with 
the Transaction Accounting Principles, applied consistently, and are consistent with the 
historical accounting principles, practices, methodologies and policies of the Company or the 
Company’s applicable Affiliates, subject to normal year-end adjustments. The Financial 
Statements have been derived from the financial books and records of the Company and the 
Company’s applicable Affiliates. Neither the Company nor any of the Company’s Affiliates 
(with respect to the Acquired Stores or Distribution Centers) has received any written 
notification from its independent accountants that the Company or any of the Company’s 
Affiliates (with respect to the Acquired Stores or Distribution Centers) has used any improper 
accounting practice that would have the effect of not reflecting or incorrectly reflecting in the 
books and records of the Company, any Affiliate of the Company (with respect to the Acquired 
Stores or Distribution Centers) or any of their subsidiaries any material properties, assets, 
liabilities, revenues, expenses, equity accounts or other accounts with respect to the Acquired 
Stores, except as has not had, and would not reasonably be expected to have, a Material 
Adverse Effect.” 
(CIK: 1618921; Filer Company: Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: 
July 3, 2017; Exhibit: 10.1; Section 3.5 Financial Statements, Undisclosed Liabilities) 
(3) Cash Flow 
“4.4. Financial Statements. 4.4.(a) Company Financial Statements. Included as Schedule 
4.4.(a) are true and complete copies of the financial statements of Company consisting of (i) a 
balance sheet of Company as of September 30, 1994, and the related statements of income and 
cash flows for the fiscal year then ended (including the notes contained therein or annexed 
thereto), which financial statements have been reported on, and are accompanied by, the signed 
review report of McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, independent accountants for Company for such 
year…” 
(CIK: 788329; Filer Company: Johnson Worldwide Associates Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing 
Date: May 15, 1995; Exhibit: 2; Section 4.4 Financial Statements) 
 
B.3 Financing Covenants (Buyers) 
“Purchaser shall have obtained the Debt Financing Commitments and the Equity Financing 
Commitments and the lenders who provided the Debt Financing Commitments and the 
investors providing the Equity Financing Commitments shall have provided the funds 
contemplated thereunder in accordance with the terms thereof.” 
“Purchaser shall have received the proceeds of debt and equity financing of Purchaser on terms 
previously approved by Seller.” 
(CIK: 40934; Filer Company: Genesee Corp; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: January 2, 2001; 
Exhibit: 10.1; Section 8.15 Financing Commitments & Section 9.11 Financing) 
 
B.4 Financial Condition Reps (Buyers) 
(1) Solvency 
“Purchaser has funds of its own, or has binding commitments from responsible banks or other 
financial institutions to provide funds, which will be sufficient and available to pay the 
Purchase Price” 
(CIK: 37755; Filer Company: Furon Co; Filing Type: 10-K; Filing Date: March 25, 1996; 
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Exhibit: 10.14; Section 5.4 Financing) 
“Sufficient funds and credit arrangements are available to Buyer as of the date hereof, and will 
be so available at the Closing, to pay the Purchase Price and all other amounts payable by it 
hereunder at the Closing.” 
(CIK: 91419; Filer Company: Smucker JM Co; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: April 15, 1994; 
Exhibit: 2.1; Section 4.3 Financial Ability to Perform) 
(2) Financing Commitment 
“Cott has cash or has existing borrowing facilities or binding firm commitments, subject to 
conditions, that are sufficient to enable it to consummate the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. The copy of the letter regarding such facilities and commitments provided by Cott 
to Seller is true and complete except for those items that are expressly redacted therein (the 
"Commitment Letter").” 
(CIK: 884713; Filer Company: Cott Corp CN; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: August 2, 2001; 
Exhibit: 2.1; Section 7.5 Financial Ability) 
(3) Capitalization 
“The authorized capital stock of Purchaser, consists of (i) 20,000,000 shares of common stock, 
par value $0.001 per share, of which 6,294,650 shares were issued and outstanding as of the 
date hereof; (ii) no shares of capital stock of Purchaser in treasury; and (iii) 5,000,000 shares 
of Preferred Stock, $0.001 par value per share, all of which have been designated Series A 
Preferred Stock and all of which were issued and outstanding as of the date hereof (each of 
which shares is convertible into four shares of common stock). Each share of the issued and 
outstanding capital stock of Purchaser is duly authorized, validly issued, fully paid and 
nonassessable. Purchaser will provide at Closing an updated version of this Section 4.2, 
updated and accurate as of the Closing (the “Updated Capitalization Representation”). The 
fully diluted percentage ownership of Purchaser represented by the Closing Shares will not 
materially change between the date hereof and the Closing. Except for outstanding options to 
purchase up to 1,200,000 shares of common stock, there are no outstanding options, warrants, 
rights (including conversion or preemptive rights) or agreements for the purchase or 
acquisition from Purchaser of any shares of its capital stock.” 
(CIK: 1035181; Filer Company: Vista Medical Technologies Inc; Filing Type: 10-K; Filing 
Date: March 30, 2004; Exhibit: 10.59; Section 4.2 Capital Stock of Purchaser) 
 
B.5 Payment Arrangements 
(1) Cash Payments and Equity Payments 
“"PURCHASE PRICE" means $81 million in cash plus a number of shares of Parent Common 
Stock that have an aggregate Market Value on the Closing Date, of $10 million; provided, 
however, that in no event shall the number of such shares be greater than 1,000,000 or less 
than 666,667.” 
(CIK: 790706; Filer Company: Golden Books Family Entertainment Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; 
Filing Date: August 30, 1996; Exhibit: 2.1; Definition “PURCHASE PRICE”) 
(2) Promissory Notes Payments 
“At the Closing, Purchaser shall deliver to Sellers…(b) two or more promissory notes 
"Promissory Notes" from Purchaser guaranteed by Purchaser Parent (such guarantees shall 
be in the form of Exhibits 1.04-1 and 1.04-2 hereto) payable to Sellers in aggregate principal 
amounts equal to 80% of the Purchase Price. The Promissory Notes shall be (i) a note in the 
principal amount of $10,000,000 (the "Offset Note") in the form of Exhibit 1.04-3, principal 
and interest otherwise payable thereunder may be offset by Seller's indemnification liabilities, 
if any, under Section 7.06 hereof, and (ii) one or more (but not more than five) notes for the 
balance of 80% of the Purchase Price (the "Other Notes"), in the form of Exhibit 1.04-4 hereto.” 
(CIK: 85408; Filer Company: Rowan Companies Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: February 
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24, 1994; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 1.04 Payment of Purchase Price) 
(3) Contingent Payments 
• Earnouts 
“With respect to the Terminal at Piney Point, Purchaser shall pay SPC an earn-out for each of 
the seven calendar years commencing January 1, 1996, equal to forty percent (40%) of the net 
revenues in such year in excess of $10,250,000 (the "Earn-Out"), as set forth more fully in 
Exhibit 2.3.2.” 
(CIK: 54441; Filer Company: Kaneb Services Inc; Filing Type: 8-KA; Filing Date: January 3, 
1996; Exhibit: 10.1; Section 2.3 Payment of Purchase Price) 
• Royalty 
“Meridian shall pay CBC royalties in an amount equal to two percent (2%) of worldwide Net 
Sales, as hereinafter defined, for each twelve month period commencing on the Closing Date 
or an anniversary thereof ("Royalty Year"), in excess of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($2,500,000) of Products and any improvements replacements or substitutions for the 
Products (collectively "Royalty Products").” 
(CIK: 794172; Filer Company: Meridian Diagnostics Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: July 
2, 1996; Exhibit: 10.1; Section A2 Consideration for Transfers, Etc.) 
• Others 
“If, within twelve months of the Closing, Buyer enters into an agreement with Daimler Benz 
Aerospace or an affiliate thereof ("DASA") pursuant to which DASA agrees to purchase at least 
600 Pylon Decoder Units, then, as additional consideration, Buyer shall pay Seller $400,000, 
which amount shall be payable in the amount of $100,000 per fiscal quarter beginning three 
months after Buyer receives an order under such agreement.” 
(CIK: 10242; Filer Company: Base Ten Systems Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: November 
12, 1997; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 3.2 Consideration Payable After Closing) 
 
B.6 Miscellaneous Mechanisms 
(1) Capital Expenditure Covenants (Sellers) 
“(Seller) not make or agree to make any capital expenditures for additions to property, plant 
or equipment, except for expenditures and commitments not exceeding $1,500,000 in the 
aggregate,” 
(CIK: 85408; Filer Company: Rowan Companies Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: February 
24, 1994; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 3.02 Operation of Sellers) 
(2) Financial Covenants (Sellers) 
“Section 9.10 Minimum Inventory. The Inventory Value set forth on the Inventory Listing 
Report after adjustments identified on the Inventory Closing Update shall be no less than Sixty 
Million Dollars ($60,000,000).” 
(CIK: 95052; Filer Company: Elizabeth Arden Inc; Filing Type: 10-K; Filing Date: September 
11, 2006; Exhibit: 10.22; Section 9.10 Minimum Inventory) 
(3) Undisclosed Liability Reps (Sellers) 
“Except as set forth on Schedule 5.4(b), Seller has no material Liabilities with respect to the 
Purchased Assets, except (i) those which are adequately reflected or reserved against in the 
Financial Statements as of the Balance Sheet Date, and (ii) those which have been incurred in 
the Ordinary Course of Business since the Balance Sheet Date and which are not, individually 
or in the aggregate, material in amount.” 
(CIK: 1028215; Filer Company: KMG Chemicals Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: January 
20, 2015; Exhibit: 10.34; Section 5.4 Financial Statements) 
(4) Books and Records Reps (Sellers) 
“All books, records and accounts of Seller related to the Business are accurate and complete 
in all material respects and are maintained in accordance with good business practice and all 
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applicable Laws.” 
(CIK: 1028215; Filer Company: KMG Chemicals Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: January 
20, 2015; Exhibit: 10.34; Section 5.4 Financial Statements) 
(5) Audit, Review, and Internal Control Reps (Sellers) 
“Seller maintains a system of accounting and internal controls sufficient in all material respects 
to provide reasonable assurances that (i) financial transactions of the Business are executed 
in accordance with the general and specific authorization of the management of Seller, (ii) all 
transactions of the Business are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with legal and accounting requirements applicable to Seller in 
connection with the Business and to maintain proper accountability for items, and (iii) access 
to the property and assets of the Business is permitted only in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization.” 
(CIK: 1028215; Filer Company: KMG Chemicals Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: January 
20, 2015; Exhibit: 10.34; Section 5.4 Financial Statements) 
(6) Adverse Change Reps (Sellers) 
• Accounting Policy Change 
“Except as and to the extent set forth in Schedule 4.7, since the date of the Recent Balance 
Sheet there has not been: …	(l) No Accounting Change. Any change in accounting methods or 
practices affecting any of the properties or assets of Company that are Purchased Assets or the 
Business;” 
(CIK: 788329; Filer Company: Johnson Worldwide Associates Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing 
Date: May 15, 1995; Exhibit: 2; Section 4.7 Absence of Certain Material Changes) 
• Capital Expenditure 
“Except for the execution and delivery of this Agreement and the transactions to take place 
pursuant hereto on or prior to the Closing Date, since July 4, 1997 there has not been any 
material adverse change, or any event or development which, individually or together with 
other such events, could reasonably be expected to result in a material adverse change, in the 
Condition of the Business. Without limiting the foregoing, except as disclosed in Section 2.6 of 
the Disclosure Schedule, there has not occurred, between July 4, 1997 and the date hereof, any 
of the following: … (vii) capital expenditures or commitments for additions to property, plant 
or equipment used or held for use in the conduct of the Business constituting capital assets in 
an aggregate amount exceeding $50,000.” 
(CIK: 1036713; Filer Company: Acorn Products Inc; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: August 22, 
1997; Exhibit: 2.1; Section 2.6 Absence of Changes) 
(7) Intellectual Property Reps (Sellers) 
“Section 3.7 Intellectual Property. (a) Seller has the right to use all the Automated Systems 
Technology without payment of royalties, fees or services to any Person. Seller has not entered 
into any License, whether on an exclusive basis or otherwise, that would interfere with Seller's 
rights in the Automated Systems Technology. Seller's rights in and to the Automated Systems 
Technology are free and clear of all Encumbrances other than Permitted Encumbrances…” 
(CIK: 21535; Filer Company: Cohu Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: October 29, 2001; 
Exhibit: 10.1; Section 3.7 Intellectual Property) 
(8) Working Capital Reps (Sellers) 
“Section 3.11 Inventories. The inventories of Seller as of the date hereof constituting part of 
the Assets and set forth on the June Balance Sheet are of standard quality and are usable and 
salable in the Ordinary Course of Business consistent with past practice, except for items that 
have been written off or written down to fair market value and for which adequate reserves 
have been provided therein.” 
(CIK: 21535; Filer Company: Cohu Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: October 29, 2001; 
Exhibit: 10.1; Section 3.11 Inventories) 
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(9) Fixed Asset Reps (Sellers) 
“Section 3.9 Real Property, Condition of Facilities. (a) Seller does not own any real property 
used in connection with the Automated Systems Business. (b) Schedule 3.9(b) contains a 
description of each Seller Lease, including the applicable landlord and expiration date, and 
the street address and approximate rentable square footage with respect to all Facilities in 
which Seller has a leasehold interest (each such parcel, a "LEASED PARCEL"). Seller 
warrants to Buyer that Seller's interest in each Leased Parcel is free and clear of all Real 
Property Encumbrances other than those identified on Schedule 3 as acceptable to Buyer 
("PERMITTED REAL PROPERTY ENCUMBRANCES") …” 
(CIK: 21535; Filer Company: Cohu Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: October 29, 2001; 
Exhibit: 10.1; Section 3.9 Real Property, Condition of Facilities) 
(10) Personal Property Reps (Sellers) 
“Section 3.10 Personal Property. (a) Seller owns good and transferable title to all of the Assets 
other than the Real Property free and clear of any Encumbrances ("NON-REAL PROPERTY 
ENCUMBRANCES"), other than those identified on Schedule 3 as acceptable to Buyer 
("PERMITTED NON-REAL PROPERTY ENCUMBRANCES") or as would not be expected to 
have a Material Adverse Effect. (b) Each item of Tangible Personal Property is in good repair 
and good operating condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted, is suitable for immediate use 
in the Ordinary Course of Business, and to Seller's Knowledge is free from latent and patent 
defects. No item of Tangible Personal Property is in need of repair or replacement other than 
as part of routine maintenance in the Ordinary Course of Business. All Tangible Personal 
Property is in the possession of Seller.” 
(CIK: 21535; Filer Company: Cohu Inc; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: October 29, 2001; 
Exhibit: 10.1; Section 3.10 Personal Property) 
(11) Third-Party Escrow 
“At Closing, Buyer shall pay to the Escrow Agent Twenty-Seven Million Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($27,500,000), to be held in accordance with the Escrow Agreement in form 
and substance as set forth in Exhibit 3.1(c) hereto (the "Escrow Agreement").” 
(CIK: 71691; Filer Company: New York Times Co; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: August 10, 




Appendix C: Direct Asset Sales Agreement Taxonomy 
 
The following five criteria are used to exclude the direct asset sales agreements of which 
the underlying transactions are de facto mergers. Extracts from agreement recitals and filing 
summaries are included in quotes. I also provide the location of reference agreements inside 
parentheses. 
 
• Criterion 1: The filer firm is the seller. 
“THIS ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into as of September 
3, 2002, by and between Metrowerks Corporation, a Texas corporation and a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Motorola, Inc. ("Purchaser"), on the one hand, and Applied Microsystems 
Corporation, a Washington corporation ("Seller"), on the other hand.”  
(CIK: 1000787; Filer Company: Applied Microsystems Corporation; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing 
Date: September 4, 2002; Exhibit: 2.1) 
 
• Criterion 2: The 8-K filing summary of the agreement contains “Certain Asset 
Purchase Agreement”. 
“On August 31, 2009, ICU Medical Inc. (the “ICU Medical”) completed the previously 
announced purchase of the commercial rights and physical assets of the critical care product 
line of Hospira, Inc. (“Hospira”), pursuant to that certain Asset Purchase Agreement (the 
“Agreement”) dated as of July 8, 2009, between ICU Medical and Hospira.” 
(CIK: 883984; Filer Company: ICU Medical Inc.; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: September 4, 
2009; Exhibit: 2.1) 
 
• Criterion 3: The agreement’s recital mentions “certain asset” or “specific asset,” 
while neither the agreement’s recital nor its filing summary mentions “all asset.” 
(1) “Certain Asset” 
“Seller desires to sell, and Buyer desires to acquire, certain of the assets of Seller and the 
Selling Subsidiaries on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement.” 
(CIK: 1002388; Filer Company: Accelrys, Inc.; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: July 29, 2011; 
Exhibit: 2.1) 
(2) “Specific Asset” 
“WHEREAS, through certain of its Affiliates and within its wireless systems segment, Seller 
conducts a worldwide wireless network systems business which designs, builds, distributes, 
maintains and supplies wireless communications systems, including land mobile radio and 
broadband equipment systems and networks and equipment for the public safety, utility, 
federal, military and commercial markets (the “Business”); and WHEREAS, Buyer desires to 
purchase the Business from Seller and its Affiliates, and Seller and its Affiliates desire to sell 
the Business to Buyer, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth;” 
(CIK: 1385157; Filer Company: Tyco Electronics Ltd.; Filing Type: 10-Q; Filing Date: May 4, 
2009; Exhibit: 10.2) 
 
• Criterion 4: The 8-K filing summary of the agreement mentions “certain asset” or 
“specific asset,” while neither the agreement’s recital nor its 8-K filing summary 
mentions “all asset.” 
(1) “Certain Asset” 
“On July 25, 2005, the Company’s wholly owned subsidiary, Acrocrete, Inc. (“Acrocrete”) 
entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “Asset Purchase Agreement”) with Degussa 
and Degussa Construction Chemicals Operations, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“DCCO”) 
(“Degussa and DCCO being the “Purchasers”), whereby the Purchasers acquired certain of 
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the manufacturing assets of Acrocrete.” 
(CIK: 49930; Filer Company: Imperial Industries Inc.; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: July 29, 
2005; Exhibit: 2.1) 
(2)  “Specific Asset” 
“On December 15, 1999, Cygnus, Inc. ("Cygnus") completed the sale of its Drug Delivery 
Business to Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. ("Ortho-McNeil"), for up to $75 million in 
cash. The sale was completed pursuant to the terms of an Asset Purchase Agreement dated as 
of November 17, 1999, between Cygnus and Ortho-McNeil, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 10.49.” 
(CIK: 870755; Filer Company: Cygnus Inc.; Filing Type: 8-K; Filing Date: December 30, 1999; 
Exhibit: 10.49) 
 
• Criterion 5: The agreement can be identified as a direct asset sales agreement after 
the manual investigation. 
“On July 31, 2002, we acquired certain assets and assumed certain liabilities of Advanced 
Hardware Architectures, Inc. for $7.0 million in cash. The purchase price was financed from 
internal Company funds. This operation is included in our telecommunications transmission 
segment.”  
(The 10-K Filing Summary) 
“Seller is engaged in the business of design, development and marketing of high value 
integrated circuit solutions and semiconductors, including technology involving single-chip 
lossless compression and decompression integrated circuits based on the Adaptive Lossless 
Data Compression algorithm (the "Business"). Buyer desires to purchase substantially all of 
the assets, properties and rights of the Business, and Seller desires to sell such assets, 
properties and rights, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement.” 
(The Agreement Recital) 
(CIK: 23197; Filer Company: Comtech Telecommunications Corporation; Filing Type: 10-K; 
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